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 ABSTRACT 
 
Since the initiation of economic reform in 1978, a large number of Chinese cities have 
experienced significant administrative restructuring processes, which mainly include 
city administering counties, county-to-city upgrading, annexation of sub-urban coun-
ties, and urban districts reconfiguration.  They not only imply spatial reorganisation in a 
certain area and physical transformation of built environment, but also bring profound 
social, economic, and political changes to the affected region. Despite the debate on its 
calculation and reliability, China’s urbanisation rate increased to 56.1% in 2015, ac-
cording to a public report released by the National Bureau of Statistics of China in early 
2016 (NBSC, 2016). However, it remains unclear to what extent the increased number 
of urban habitants should be attributed to such state behaviours as redrawing urban 
boundaries and changing urban definition. Locating state in China’s urban transfor-
mation is crucial and debatable, which needs to take into account the reshuffling state 
power among governments at different levels. In an outstanding example of China’s 
administrative system, the central government maintains power to establish new cities, 
enlarge existing cities, redraw and/or merge districts within cities, and even abolish cit-
ies (Cartier, 2015). To explain the significance of administrative restructuring, the state 
reiterates the need to facilitate effective territorial management and reconfigure central-
hinterland relationships in the metropolitan area. However, the underlying reasons for 
territorial changes in a locality vary from region to region and are under-examined. 
Few if any existing studies written about Chinese administrative restructuring focus on 
either national-level or large cities, but little is known about the process of administra-
tive restructuring in small- and medium-sized cities, especially those in the less devel-
oped central and western China. This article examines two adjustments in Bengbu’s 
administrative territory, in 2004 and 2014 respectively, with a particular focus on the 
critical role that the local state has played in the policy design and implementation pro-
cess. With reference to the institutional arrangement, pro-growth urban governance 
theories, the scale perspective, and their implications in China’s urban studies, this pa-
per attempts to develop a comprehensive analytical framework and advance the under-
standing of administrative restructuring in Chinese cities. This analysis raises four 
questions. First, why and under what circumstances can local officials be motivated to 
promote administrative restructuring? Second, what are the main mechanisms behind 
 administrative restructuring? Third, who are the major players if there is a pro-grow 
coalition built in the process and what are their roles? Finally, what are the impacts of 
administrative restructuring on Bengbu City and their implications? 
Listed as an important industrial city by the central state and allocated many heavy in-
dustry projects in the late 1970s, Bengbu is now seen as a less-developed city at pro-
vincial and national level due to the lack of capacity and flexibility in response to mar-
ketisation and decentralisation. The evidence from this study suggests that the primary 
motivation behind urban districts reconfiguration and part of the surrounding counties 
annexation lies in an urgent need to promote economic growth in the edge area between 
urban and rural, as well as to remove the barriers for urban development as a whole. 
During this process, the urban-rural integration, or the so-called functional integration 
of the peripheral area into the urban core can be manifested in a series of ways such as 
appointing urban officials in the previous rural area, introducing market mechanism to 
tackle economic problems during the reform, and encouraging local dwellers to work 
from primary industry to the secondary and tertiary industry.  
Although the administrative restructuring in Bengbu has statistically facilitated local 
economic growth, one problem with this kind of government-led urban development is 
that the needs of the local habitants were largely ignored and bottom-up voice could be 
hardly heard in the decision making process. Moreover, the evidence of Bengbu indi-
cates that the work of urban planning and the progress of administrative restructuring 
have been mutually responsive to each other. As a result, the rarely coordinated devel-
opment has degraded land use efficiency, forced the relocation of affected residents, 
and triggered conflicts over social and environmental issues. The story of the new ur-
ban district in Bengbu also echoes with what characterize most of the urban peripheries 
in contemporary Chinese cities –a juxtaposition of agricultural, industrial, and residen-
tial activities (Ma & Wu, 2005; McGee, 1989). 
Reviewing the development of a newly established urban district in Bengbu, two ad-
justments have gradually produced a pro-growth coalition in which the municipal gov-
ernment initiated, the district government led, and the private sector joined. Compared 
with those economically developed regions where administrative restructuring has been 
seen as a direct response to central government project, the impact of the central state 
on Bengbu is more ideological through providing broad guidelines than tangible by the 
 means of direct intervention. Moreover, the empirical finding is different from econom-
ically advanced region with regards to the disagreements among local governments. 
The evidence of Bengbu tends to be more agreeable whilst the other group experiences 
more intense conflicts and competitions, which could be partly explained by the differ-
ent extents to which administrative system lags behind economic reforms in the 
coastal-interior divide. 
Considering the extensive urban construction and industrial development in a newly 
established district is at the cost of destroying the place-specific locational advantage, 
an important implication of this study is that for other regions which may have the 
similar development constraints that Bengbu City faced more than ten years ago, if 
there is an alternative approach to figure out the problems. As reminded by Ma (2002) 
and Wei (2012), industrial growth should not be the only path that Chinese cities have 
pursued for reaching a more vibrant local economy, which makes Chinese cities are 
broadly similar to each other. Local endogenous resources, which are the agricultural 
base and beneficial transportation system in this case study, should be respected. In ad-
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Chapter 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research background 
Since the initiation of economic reform in 1978, a number of Chinese cities have ex-
perienced significant administrative restructuring processes, which include city ad-
ministering counties, county-to-city upgrading, annexation of suburban counties, and 
urban districts merge and reorganising.  They not only imply spatial reorganisation in 
a certain area and physical transformation of built environment, but also bring pro-
found social, economic, and political changes to the affected region. Instead of pursu-
ing regional egalitarianism and controlling urban growth in Mao’s era, China’s lead-
ership in the reform-era implements a thoroughly different strategy, which encour-
ages a significant degree of market-driven freedom and allows substantial flexibilities 
in the development of urban society and space. Despite the debate on its calculation 
and reliability, China’s urbanisation rate increased to 56.1% in 2015, according to a 
public report released by the National Bureau of Statistics of China in early 2016 
(NBSC, 2016). However, it remains unclear to what extent the increased number of 
urban habitants should be attributed to such state behaviours as redrawing urban 
boundaries and changing urban definition. Locating state in China’s urban transfor-
mation is crucial and debatable, which needs to take into account the reshuffling state 
power among governments at different levels. In an outstanding example of China’s 
administrative system, the central government maintains power to establish new cit-
ies, enlarge existing cities, redraw and/or merge districts within cities, and even abol-
ish cities (Cartier, 2015). To explain the significance in restructuring territorial space, 
the state reiterates the need to facilitate effective territorial management and reconfig-
ure central-hinterland relationships in the metropolitan area. However, the underlying 
reasons for territorial changes in a locality vary from region to region and are under-
examined.  
Being increasingly complicated and contentious, the interpretation and the manifesta-
tion of government strategy have gradually shifted from a traditional economic con-
cern to a spectrum of matters including all social, political, ecological, and cultural 
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perspectives (Geddes & Newman, 1999; González & Healey, 2005; Morgan, 2004). 
In the Western context, the administrative rearrangements mostly impose impacts on 
infrastructure construction and social services provision. In contrast, reforms in Chi-
na’s administrative system touch upon significant changes in local development, in-
cluding redefining jurisdictions of official appointments, amending development pri-
orities in a certain area, and reclassifying individuals and places as rural or urban 
(Cartier, 2015).  
Existing literature published on China’s administrative system focuses on such topics 
as the meaning and importance of different administrative level (Ma, 2005; Ma & 
Cui, 2004), urban spatial restructuring as well as its underlying impacts (Ma, 2004; 
Qian, 2012), and the role of governmental policies on urban development (Cartier, 
2015; Lin, Yin, & Ma, 2011; Zhang &Wu, 2006). Most studies in this field focus on 
either the central state or the lower levels of government. However, considering the 
significance of the central-local dynamics in urban development, it is critical to con-
sider the shifting priorities of central government’s policy from a top-down view and 
to illustrate the implications of such changes for administrative system in affected ter-
ritories from a bottom-up perspective. That is to say, there is an urgent need to ex-
plore how administrative restructuring has been guided by the central policies and 
forged by the local governments in post-reform China1. The changing state policy can 
be seen as a lens through which the reorientations, priorities, and limitations of state 
reforms are presented. As Skocpol (1995, p. 58) suggests, “policies have the ability to 
transform or expand the capacities of the state. They therefore change the administra-
tive possibilities for official initiatives in the future and affect later prospects for poli-
cy implementations”. 
While many scholars have discussed the subject of administrative restructuring at the 
aggregate level, investigations at the individual-city level continue to be relatively 
scant. A few case studies mainly concentrate on several large metropolitans or well-
known areas such as Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou, as well as Pearl River Delta 
                                                
1 The multi-level government structure in Chins complicates the term – local governments. In the general discus-
sion of this thesis, local governments refer to sub-national governments. In the empirical study part, local govern-
ments mostly indicate the municipal- and district- level governments. 
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and Yangtze River Delta (Cartier, 2015; Gu & Jiang, 2004; Wei, 2012; Zhang & Wu, 
2006). In contrast, the small- and medium-sized ones dominating a large number of 
Chinese cities still remain under-examined in the literature, which resonates with the 
call for more research in the less-developed central and western China (Chen et al., 
2015; Li, et al., 2015; Liu, Yin, & Ma, 2011; Qian, 2012). Moreover, as a contextual-
ised subject, urban governance in China needs more microscopic investigations to 
facilitate the understanding. This research attempts to fill that gap of knowledge 
through investigating the administrative restructuring implemented in Bengbu City. 
1.2 Research aims and questions 
This article examines two adjustments in Bengbu’s administrative territory, in 2004 
and 2014 respectively, with a particular focus on the critical role that the local state 
has played in the policy design and implementation process. Compared to economi-
cally developed area where various administrative restructuring strategies are adopted 
such as county to city upgrading, annexation of suburban counties, and urban districts 
merge and restructuring, small- and medium-sized cities tend to implement adminis-
trative restructuring through reorganising urban districts and annexing part of sur-
rounding counties. This research aims to advance the understanding of administrative 
restructuring in China by investigating the changing state development priorities and 
the evolution of China’s administrative restructuring. More importantly, the research 
attempts to develop a comprehensive analytical framework to understand the recent 
reform in China’s administrative system based on the institutional arrangement, pro-
growth urban governance theories, as well as the scale perspective. In particular, a 
newly established urban district is paid significant attention and given critical discus-
sions.  
This analysis raises four questions. First, why and under what circumstances can local 
officials be motivated to promote administrative restructuring? Second, what are the 
main mechanisms behind administrative restructuring? Third, who are the major 
players if there is a pro-grow coalition built in the process and what are their roles? 
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Finally, what are the impacts of administrative restructuring on Bengbu City and their 
implication?  
1.3 Organisation of this thesis 
The overall structure of the study takes the form of six chapters. After the introducto-
ry chapter, Chapter Two presents the research methodology. Chapter Three reviews 
the changing state development priorities and the evolution of administrative restruc-
turing in China. The implication of urban restructuring on China’s city size distribu-
tion is also discussed in Chapter Three because large and small cities do not grow in 
the same way and both endogenous and exogenous factors account for the differ-
ences. In Chapter Four, the institutional perspective, pro-growth urban governance 
theories, the scale theory, and their implication in China are used to understand the 
adoption of the government-led administrative restructuring approach as the theoreti-
cal baseline. Chapter Five presents the empirical study of the research, focusing on 
the three key themes: the background behind the administrative restructuring process 
in Bengbu, the implementation processes over the last decade or so, and the underly-
ing challenges and strategies in the establishment and development of a newly estab-
lished urban district. The analysis particularly concentrates on Huaishang District in 
Bengbu City because it was an agricultural hinterland to the urban core before the 
municipality launched the first time administrative restructuring process, and experi-
enced the most significant changes during this transition. The discussion in Chapter 
Six includes three themes:  administrative restructuring as a strategy of urban gov-
ernment, the creation of a pro-growth coalition in the process of administrative re-
structuring, and the relationship between administrative restructuring and urban plan-
ning. Chapter Seven concludes. 
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Chapter 2.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research approach: a qualitative design 
Research methodology provides an underlying approach to the study. In particular, 
qualitative research is intended to generate concrete context-based knowledge as seen 
through the eyes of the people being studied. The advantage of applying a qualitative 
method is not only to deal with complexity (administrative restructuring) and highly 
contextualised phenomena (in the Chinese context), but also to realise its potential in 
answering the ‘why’ and ‘how’ research questions (Baxter & Jack, 2008).  
Conventionally, the aim of qualitative research is not to draw statistical inference; 
thus, there is no rule to determine size of sample (Blaikie, 2007). This study uses pur-
poseful sampling to obtain in-depth information from the most relevant respondents. 
With a purposive non-random sampling approach, which is one of the techniques of-
ten used in qualitative study, the number of interviewees is less important than the 
criteria used to select them (Wilmot, 2005). This is because a phenomenon only ap-
pears once to be valuable and there is no need for a large number as these is no need 
for statistical estimation. In addition, snowballing, which allows interviewees to rec-
ommend others they know with the same or specified characteristics, is also a method 
adopted in this qualitative research (Weiss, 1995). 
A case study approach is used to allow a realistic and careful observation to be made 
in pursuit of research purposes. This approach facilitates the exploration of a contex-
tualised phenomenon through accessing a variety of data sources, ensuring the study 
is investigated through divergent lenses which enable multiple facets of the phenom-
enon to be discovered and understood (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Potential data sources 
may include, but are not limited to: documentation, archival records, interviews, and 
direct observations (Yin, 2013); among them, interviewing is considered a valuable 
and effective tool to look deeply and broadly into subjective realities. Interview 
method allows us to take into consideration on “the social actor’s experience and per-
spective through stories, accounts, and explanations”, gather “information about 
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things or processes that cannot be observed effectively by other means”, and elicit 
“language forms used by social actors in natural settings” (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, 
p. 173). Recently, qualitative interviewing gains high adaptability. This data collec-
tion method can be conducted “anywhere two people can talk in relative privacy” (p. 
170-171). It takes the form of face-to-face group interviewing, mailed questionnaires, 
and telephone interviewing. This research adopts semi-structured interviewing data 
collection method, which has a planned set of general questions with flexibility to an-
swer and accommodate exploratory issues raised by the respondents, as well as 
mailed questionnaires (Saunders, 2011).  
2.2 Case selection 
The existing research attempts to categorize Chinese cities based on different geo-
graphical measurement and location, varied population size, and diverse endogenous 
natural resources (Lin, 2002; Liu, Yin, & Ma 2011; Wei, 2007). Intrigued by different 
motivations such as the significance of local states, the substantial economic devel-
opment of certain area, and the availability of contextual information, researchers 
have produced a considerable amount of literature on such types of cities as coastal 
city, megacity, resource-based city (e.g. mining city) (Tan, Xu, & Zhang, 2016; Wu, 
2003; Ye, 2013). However, Bengbu City, which is the case study in this research, 
does not belong to any aforementioned city categories. It does not mean the case se-
lection has no typicality. Instead, like Bengbu, a large number of inland cities are in 
small- and medium- size without attractive economic performance. The similarity be-
tween these unknown cities and their popular counterparts is that most of them have 
experienced significant administrative restructuring. This selection of Bengbu as a 
case study shows the researcher’s interest in the paucity of studies on the small- and 
medium-sized Chinese cities. The objective of this case selection is not to claim that a 
single city is sufficiently representative to make widely applicable generalisations, 
but to help fill the gap of knowledge with potential implications for other cities under 
similar conditions. 
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Good qualitative research is seen as a relevant, timely, significant, and interesting one 
(Tracy, 2010). In social science, “carefully chose experiments, cases, and experienc-
es” may greatly add to the generalisability of a case study “as favourable as possible” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 226). According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC 
(2015), among total 33 areas experiencing administrative restructuring in the year of 
2015, 18 are from inland provinces such as Jiangxi, Hebei, Anhui, and Sichuang. 
What is embedded in this process is the fact that a growing number of rural popula-
tion and space have been reclassified with urban status. For example, in Shangrao 
City of Jiangxi Province, abolishing counties and establishing districts enlarged urban 
area and urban population to 2.8 times and 5.5 times (Shangrao, 2015, June 6). More 
astonishingly, the urban area soared into eight times in Baoding City of Hebei Prov-
ince after annexing three counties into urban districts (Wei, 2015, May 13). The GDP 
per capita in Shangrao and Baoding is less than RMB 35000 (US$ 5276) meanwhile 
those in cities like Beijing and Shanghai is more than RMB 100000 (US$ 15076) 
(China State Statistical Bureau, 2015).  
Following these methodology philosophies, Bengbu City in Anhui Province was se-
lected as a case study area (figure 1) out of three main reasons. Firstly, Bengbu is a 
typical example representing a large number of small- and medium-sized Chinese cit-
ies, especially those in the less developed central and western China. By the end of 
2014, the jurisdiction of Bengbu has a total population of 3.26 million, with 50.91% 
as urban population (Bengbu Municipal Government, 2015). According to China 
State Statistical Bureau (2012), among the total 289 cities at or above prefecture-level 
in China, there are 82 cities with urban population between one and two million in-
cluding Bengbu. Secondly, on the one hand, Bengbu, which was listed as an im-
portant industrial city by the State Council and allocated many heavy industry pro-
jects in the late 1970s, once strongly contributed to the national industrial growth. On 
the other hand, it is now regarded as a less-developed city, provincially and national-
ly, due to the lack of capacity and flexibility in response to marketisation and decen-
tralisation. Similar to Shangrao and Baoding, the GDP per capita of Bengbu City is 
RMB 38462 (US$ 5800) (China State Statistical Bureau, 2015). Thirdly, which is al-
so the most important one, Bengbu is one of the hundreds of small- and medium-
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sized Chinese cities that have experienced significant administrative restructuring. 
With few changes in the total administrative area, the area of urban district has been 
enlarged from less than 450 km² to 956.9 km² in the past decade or so. 
Figure 1. The location of the case study in China 
Source: Bengbu Urban Development Strategic (Tongji University, 2010); revised by the author. 
2.3 Data acquisition and fieldwork 
Generally speaking, doing fieldwork in China is difficult and sometimes highly un-
certain in practice. These obstacles of getting access to data in China can be listed as 
follows: a lack of social networks, political constraints, ethical and/or cultural dilem-
mas (Heimer & Thøgersen, 2006; Lunn, 2014). In particular, a recent study by Cartier 
(2015, p. 298) puts forward four challenges that research on Chinese administrative 
system may encounter: “access to contextual and comparative information, historicis-
ing the process of change, theoretical innovation in relation to the secondary litera-
ture, and use and interpretation of Chinese characters and terms”. She further points 
out that the lack of the administrative restructuring studies reflects “non-transparent 
conditions of information, and lack of comparative theoretical baseline” (p. 315). The 
   
 
13 
researcher of this study also faced many difficulties in the process of fieldwork. 
Therefore, a variety of data sources have been collected in order to counteract the po-
tential weakness of data acquisition. 
A combination of data sources, including documentation, archival records, inter-
views, and direct observations, were gathered at various time points from 2013 to 
2016. Insightful and inspiring documentation and archival records include Bengbu 
Daily Newspapers, Bengbu Chronicle, Bengbu Urban Development Strategic Plan 
conducted by Tongji University in 2010, Bengbu Urban Development Strategic Plan 
conducted by Hsinghua University in 2010, Bengbu Statistical Yearbook, Bengbu 
Government Work Report, Bengbu Transportation Investigation Report. Meanwhile, 
the paper documents together with observation were considered as important support 
for guiding the interviews. 
As discussed earlier, the selection of interviewees was based on purposeful and 
snowballing sampling rules. All of the interviews have either a manual recording or a 
completed questionnaire sheet. The interviews with key government officials also 
have a digital recording based on their approval. The overview of main interviewees 
in the fieldwork, including the name of interviewees’ institution, the title of each in-
formant, and the interview date, can be traced in the Appendix 1. To capture the depth 
and nuance of the role of government, the authors conducted lengthy open-ended in-
terviews with local government officials including one vice mayor, two urban plan-
ners at the municipal level, and four government representatives at the district level. 
These interviews delve deeply into their attitudes toward the motivations, processes, 
and impacts of Bengbu’s administrative restructuring. All of these interviews were 
held in their offices, lasting from 30 minutes to two hours with an approximate 45 
minutes. Before each interview, the interviewees were informed with regards to inter-
view motivation, confidential issue, interview time and venue. In general, these inter-
views went smoothly.  
Despite the decision making and the implementation process of administrative re-
structuring in China seldom consult residents in impacted jurisdiction, this research 
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attempts to involve the voice of local stakeholders and encourage their dialogue with 
local officials. Therefore, another 33 short interviews and questionnaires were con-
ducted with local informants who are mainly enterprise owners and factory workers. 
In addition, I was introduced to seven real estate company representatives, with 
whom I conducted investigation with questionnaires. The aim of these questionnaires 
was to gather information relevant to the evaluation of administrative restructuring 
process, including the economic development, infrastructure, housing, the living envi-
ronment, and the attitudes to the local government. It is hoped that a combination of 
first- and second-hand data could make the empirical investigate an intellectual and 
substantial one.  
 
Chapter 3.  ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRUCTURING IN CHINA 
China’s administrative system, originated from the Qin Dynasty more than 2000 
years ago, is seen as “the most stable element in the historical annals of the Chinese 
state” (Fitzgerald, 2002, p. 11). With China entering into socialist planned economy, 
this system has started to act as an unitary centralized power system, allowing the 
higher tier of government to control the lower level of government through adminis-
trative order, mandatory plans, resource and financial allocation, and personal ap-
pointments and removals (Ma & Cui, 1987; Chen, 1991; Zhang & Wu, 2006). The 
generalised schema of China’s administrative/spatial system is delineated in four fun-
damental levels (figure 2). Throughout the period from 1949-1978, the hierarchical 
administrative system resulted in a strict top-down vertical control, although a bureau 
or an agency could also respond to the other at the same administrative level within a 
territory. From the socialist planned economy to the contemporary reform era, the 
administrative system reflected the persistent reconfiguration of China’s social, polit-
ical, and economic development.  




Figure 2. China’s administrative/spatial system, 2002 
Source: Ma (2002) 
3.1 Changing state development priorities and the evolution of adminis-
trative restructuring in China 
3.1.1 A balanced development strategy in the pre-reform era 
Learnt from the Soviet Union, China adopted a command economic system since the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC): Resource allocation depended 
upon the administrative hierarchy rather than prices from the market. A large portion 
of resourceS was concentrated in the hands of commanders. The key features of the 
Soviet-type economic strategy, according to Dernberger (1982), can be summarised 
to high input of investment, priority to heavy industry and military, priority to in-
vestment in production, investment in basic needs, and preference for limited foreign 
trade. China is no exception to implementing these strategies, which have been vigor-
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ously challenged afterwards. One of the criticisms is that the heavy industry devel-
opment strategy in the pre-reform era violated rules of comparative advantages be-
cause the capital was scarce and labour was abundant at that time (Kanbur & Zhang, 
2005). Prioritising heavy industry directly resulted in a relatively slow growth in agri-
cultural output and indirectly led to an enlarging urban-rural disparity.  The other crit-
ical criticism is that from the 1950s to the early 1970s, the Chinese government delib-
erately developed the economic growth of inland cities whilst discouraged investment 
in coastal areas (Fan & Scott, 2003). The state selected remote and inland regions for 
key sectors such as automobiles and steel but prevented spatial clustering (Fan & 
Scott, 2003; Naughton, 1988). The key feature of China’s development during this 
period was slow growth of living standards. It cannot be denied that China was 
among the poorest countries in the world at that time.  
Compared with the capitalist economies where territorial boundaries are generally 
porous in restricting the flow of local and non-local sources, the boundary effects in 
China are much stronger due to the fact that the distribution of development resource 
and statutory power have always been related to administrative hierarchy (Ma, 2005; 
Zhang & Wu, 2006). In the pre-reform phase, there were limited changes in the ar-
rangement of administrative system because the state adopted a balanced develop-
ment strategy and set strict control on the urbanisation scale. Seen as a ‘necessary 
evil’ during Mao’s control, cities were regarded as breeding grounds for capitalist in-
iquities and other Western wrongdoing (Chien, 2010). Moreover, cities had jurisdic-
tion only over small urban and suburban spaces while the rest of areas were ruled by 
the rural-based system. Although prefecture governments were in charge of the de-
velopment of rural areas, generally, it was not the prefectures but the counties that 
really possessed the power (Chung & Lam, 2004). The prefecture governments were 
seen as a ‘dispatched organ’ (paichu jigou) of the provincial authorities. 
To ensure stable supplies of vegetables and non-staple food for the urban population, 
several economically developed cities were authorised by the central state to adminis-
ter their surrounding counties in 1958; this reform was formally institutionalised in 
the National People’s Congress in 1959 (Pu, 2006). However, due to the food short-
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age resulting from natural disasters and inappropriate political decisions, the speed of 
city administering counties slowed down in the 1960s. It was not until 1978 that the 
Constitution officially canonised this system and put forward that city (shi) is a hy-
brid territorial and administrative entity consisting of both urban and rural units, clari-
fying that centrally administered cities and large cities can incorporate urban districts 
and counties. 
3.1.2 City-prioritised administrative restructuring in the early reform 
The late 1970s witnessed a profound transition process in China socially, economical-
ly, and politically. The transition, according to Smith and Pickles (1998, p. 2), is not 
“a one-way process of change from one hegemonic system to another”; rather, it 
“constitutes a complex reworking of old social relations”. In Eastern European coun-
tries, the ‘big bang’ transition is used to describe the prompt process of destroying the 
command economy and creating a market economy. To achieve the liberalisation of 
the price system and the privatisation of ownership, this approach inevitably triggered 
large short-run adjustment costs due to the discontinuous changes in the price system 
and the sharp increases in unemployment rate (Naughton, 1995). In China, a dual 
track system illustrates the coexistence of a traditional plan and a market channel, and 
it has been espoused as a transitional device with which the old command track of 
production and exchange tends to perpetuate to allow the state direct control over the 
country and guarantee social and economic stability.  
With the gradual introduction of market reforms in the 1980s, the central government 
privileged city as its favoured area and the emergence of the city as a standard unit in 
the administrative system foreshadowed one of most significant rearrangements of 
China’s territorial administration since Yuan Dynasty (Fitzgerald, 2002). It empha-
sised that state’s territorial organisation was reoriented from a historical province- 
and county-based to a distinct form of city-based. Consequently, the State Council 
started to permit provinces to abolish prefectures. 
Compared to the pre-reform practice, which was mainly in the large urban centres 
like Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Dalian, city administering county has been im-
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plemented on a large scale since the 1980s when cities were authorised to be the 
growth engine for national economy. In the sixth five-year plan (1981-1985) issued 
by the central government, Zhao Ziyang, then Premier, put forward that large- and 
medium-sized cities should be economic centres to organise and manage economic 
activities, and to promote rural economic growth (Zhao, 1981). Under this proposal, a 
growing number of prefecture-level cities became a unit composed of urban districts, 
surrounding suburban counties, and possible nearby county-level cities (Chung, 
2007). With the implementation of this city administering county policy, city gov-
ernments were empowered by the state to stimulate the development of rural econo-
my, to alleviate bureaucracy conflicts, to facilitate rural-urban integration, and to have 
de jure jurisdiction over lower-level administrative units such as urban planning, tax 
levies, and distribution of resources (Zhang & Wu, 2006). Some counties, however, 
wanted to abolish this system because the resources formerly collected by the coun-
ties as independent and fundamental administrative units are now in the hand of the 
central city (Liu, 1996).  
Although the implementation of city administering county enables cities to have more 
administrative and economic power than before, the result has been less than satisfac-
tory. For example, it is argued that this strategy has introduced de facto conflicts be-
tween the central city and its subordinate counties such as unequal resource allocation 
and imbalance development (Tang & Chung, 2000). The resources under unfair allo-
cation can be both tangible such as administrative funds and intangible such as the 
yearly quota for the reclassification of agricultural to non-agricultural population 
(nongzhuanfei zhibiao) (Liu & Wang, 2001).  In other words, the administrative and 
economic power granted to cities as well as the industrial development prioritised by 
the state are at the expense of the subordinate counties and agricultural development. 
The thorny issue is that if the central city is economically stronger than the adminis-
tered counties, the former often tends to exploit the resources of the latter especially 
in terms of the suburban land (Ma, 2002). On the other hand, if the economic condi-
tion of the central city is weaker than its subordinate counties, an underdeveloped city 
core can hardly lead and benefit the periphery (Chung & Lam, 2004). In addition, city 
authorities have been found to acquire food grains from the subordinate counties for 
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the urban population by paying them low prices. On the whole, the question that if 
this policy has reached the declared goal of regional integration remains vague due to 
the fragmentation it produced. Nevertheless, by 1997, 97% of the cities at and above 
the prefecture-level were authorised to administer adjacent counties (Liu, Feng, Hua, 
& Fan, 2002).  
One of the most significant changes to the administrative system in the reform era has 
been the establishment of cities. In China, neither the citizens nor the local govern-
ments have the discretion to create new cities. It is decided by the central government 
that if a jurisdiction can be entitled with urban administrative status. Before 1984, the 
approach of carving out a block of space for establishing a city (qiekuai jianshi) dom-
inated the establishment of cities. The main considerations under this strategy were 
economic functions, the size of population, and the share of non-agricultural popula-
tion (Zhang & Zhao, 1998). Since the early 1980s, the numerical expansion of cities 
has been largely through the administrative measures of turning prefectures into cit-
ies. For example, in 1983 and 1996, all the prefecture agencies in Jiangsu Province 
were abolished and five more prefecture-level cities were established (JSYBPH, 
2003). The significance of this county to city upgrading reform was that a whole 
county, which was previously a rural area with mainly rural population, could be 
converted into a city without changing administrative boundaries. The purpose of in-
troducing this strategy was to facilitate economic growth through industrial restruc-
turing and encourage labour from agricultural to non-agricultural work (Zhang & 
Zhao, 1998). Although rural economic reforms and the vigorous development of 
small towns occurred in a large scale, such change in administrative status also has 
negative effects, such as conflicts over land and other resources, redundant bureau-
cracy, dysfunctional government, as well as inappropriate size of space carved out to 
establish a city (Pu, 2006). Approximately 70% of the current Chinese cities were 
designated through this approach (Ma, 2005). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, China witnessed a substantial development of the county to 
city upgrading through which the local authority could gain more power in the eco-
nomic development of the jurisdiction. Empirical evidence shows that in the devel-
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oped area, since the GDP per capita in many county-level units exceeded that in the 
central city, a number of counties demanded to be upgraded to county-level or even 
prefecture-level cities for possessing more fiscal retention and decision-making pow-
er (Zhang & Wu, 2006). County-level governments endeavoured to negotiate with 
central government for acquiring city status because a city is seen to have several ad-
vantages over a county for economic, land, and strategic interests (Shen, 2004a). 
Nevertheless, with more and more criticism on the declining quality and quantity of 
arable land, illicit criteria of city designations in practice, as well as the weak regula-
tion and management of administrative system, the State Council suspended the ap-
proval on the application of abolishing county and establishing city in the end of 1997 
(Wang, 2002; Wang, Wang, & Zhang, 2008).  
Table 1 lists a series of benefits associated with city status, which were cited from a 
wide range of studies. In general, the nuance of a city status stems from the belief that 
it can bring more development opportunities to the affected jurisdiction. However, the 
perceived benefits of being a city and the empirical evidence are unlikely to be con-
sistent. Using a large data set covering all counties during 1993–1997, Li (2011) ar-
gues that upgrading cities only provides a one-time incentive to local officials and 
makes this mechanism short sighted in the sense that the rewards are for past econom-
ic performance rather than future improvement. Moreover, based on a panel dataset at 
county level, Fan, Li, and Zhang (2012) evaluate the effect of county-to-city upgrad-
ing policy and find that places with a new city status do not yield better performance 
in local economic growth, public services provision, or job creation. They also argue 
that the main reason can be attributed to a one-time incentive to local governments 
provided by this one-fits-all policy and a lack of consideration in the matter of city 
size. Although numbers as quantitative indicators are important in their own right, it 
may fail to grasp the complexity of county-to-city upgrading process at the individual 
city level. Upgraded to a county-level city from a formerly rural county in the year of 
1989, Kunshan has successfully transferred itself into the most economically power-
ful county-level city in China since 2000 (Chien & Wu, 2011). Compared to other 
places, the main advantage of Kunshan is that the development path mostly depends 
on both the endogenous and exogenous factors and combines the market forces and 
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the involvement of the state in different perspectives of local development such as 
land development, foreign investment, and territorial collaboration.  
 
Table 1. Benefits of being a city: an incomplete list 
Source: Fan, Li, and Zhang (2012, p. 479); compiled by the author. 
3.1.3 The widespread annexation of suburban counties since 2000 
In addition to numerical growth, physical enlargement of cities has been remarkable 
in China especially in those cities, which are among the fastest growing ones with 
regards to economic development. The strategy of annexing suburban counties is also 
adopted in cities where the old city centre has been fully developed and further devel-
opment has been constrained by the limited urban area. In the process of urbanisation, 
the state continuously promotes the development of urban districts through upgrading 
a county or a county-level city to an urban district. Unlike counties or county-level 
cities, urban districts are generally under the control of a municipality in terms of 
their land and fiscal revenue (Cartier, 2015). More accurately, a municipal govern-
ment is in charge of most of the political and economic matters while the district gov-
ernment mainly functions as a public service provider (Shen, 2004a). It is believed 
that this kind of administrative restructuring would “benefit citywide planning and 
rural-urban integration, facilitate the decentralisation of urban industries, and reduce 
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the hurdles for the expansion of urban built up areas” (Ma, 2005, p.492). This mecha-
nism was once adopted widely in China: at national level, until the end of 1984, 90 
cities became the recipients of city annexing county and more than 50 million people 
were affected by these changes (Ma & Cui, 1987).  
Although there is a widely held view among Chinese officials that cities generally 
carry more prestige than rural areas, it has been extensively argued that related poli-
cies are adopted without carefully considering its theoretical foundation and potential 
problems (Xu & Yeh, 2011; Zhang & Wu, 2006; Qian, 2012; Wu & Zhang, 2007). 
From the end of 2000 to the middle of 2002, the administrative annexation in the 
Yangtze River Delta (YRD) sharply increased the jurisdiction area of its prefecture-
level cities from 4352 km² to 17539 km² (table 2). Since large-scale annexation can 
easily trigger discontents from annexed county-level units, municipal governments 
have to make some concessions which may result in a negative influence on the city 
development. For example, when annexed by Changzhou City, Wujin district asked 
to retain its independent fiscal system which eventually got approval by the municipal 
government. As such, Changzhou paid less attention to the new district and it ended 
with a large-sized economic development zone in the city north and a large-sized in-
dustrial zone in the south of the Wujin district without thinking about the efficiency 
of industrial distribution pattern (Xu & Yeh, 2011). This is also evident in the case of 
Hangzhou. In 2001 and 2014, this provincial city went through two annexation pro-
cessed which turned Xiaoshan, Yuhang, and Fuyang counties into three urban admin-
istrative districts, increasing the geographical size of the city from 683 km² to 4876 
km² (Qian, 2015). However, in order to reduce land revenue loss to the municipality, 
the county-level governments of Xiaoshan and Yuhang quickly leased land use rights 
to developers for industrial and residential users sharply before the annexation was 
implemented (Qian, 2012).  This example is a typical illustration of how inefficient 
land use can be triggered by administrative restructuring. 




Table 2. Annexation into city districts in the Yangtze River Delta, Dec. 2000-Apr. 2002 
Source: Zhang and Wu (2006, p. 12) 
 
Along with rapid economic and industrial development, the other major developed 
region Pearl River Delta (PRD) has also undergone urban annexations in the name of 
alleviating administrative conflicts, rationalising land use, and promoting rural-urban 
integration (Yeung, 2005; table 3). For example, Panyu’s autonomy in resource allo-
cation has been decreased with the status changing from an independent county-level 
city administered by Guangzhou to an urban district of Guangzhou. To strengthen 
Guangzhou’s status in Southern China, the provincial government has fully endeav-
oured to support the process of merging Panyu into Guangzhou (Wu & Zhang, 2007). 
It is worthy to note that the removal and relocation of local officials could be used by 
core cities when county-level cadres oppose this annexation; an example is Foshan’s 
annexation of the powerful suburban economies of Shunde, Nanhai, Sanshui, and 
Gaoming (Lin, 2009). 
 
Table 3: Annexation into city districts in selected cities in Yangtze River Delta, 2000-2004 
Source: Yeung (2005, p. 8) 
 
Since most of counties were dominated by agricultural areas before the implementa-
tion of annexation, this approach is likely to end with significant imbalance in spatial 
pattern among different districts within a prefecture-level city. Taking the city of 
Yangzhou as an example, a distinguish contrast is the 825 km² area in the annexed 
Hanjiang county and the 26 km² area in the old Guanglin district in city centre. Since 
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the old Guanglin district demanded expansion, Yangzhou municipal government had 
to extend the administrative area of Guanglin district to 67 km² which indirectly put 
the ancient old city area at stake (Zhang & Wu, 2006). The concern, historical in na-
ture, was also reflected in Huangshi City of Hubei province: in 2005, when the city 
government announced a proposal for annexing Dazhi County. Residents of Dazhi 
organised street demonstrations of opposition because they feared that the annexation 
would result in the loss of their historical identity as Dazhi People (Chien, 2010). 
3.1.4 The urban districts and its restructuring 
Cities in China do not have a uniform and standardised administrative structure, but 
cover the centrally administered municipalities, province-level cities, subprovince-
level cities, prefecture-level cities, and county-level cities. Excluding county-level 
ones, the rest of cities generally consist of counties and urban districts. In China’s 
Constitutional framework, an urban district is like the province, city, county, and 
township, which are listed as a formal level of state administrative unit. However, 
owning to the nature of urban governance, the urban district in China cannot be seen 
as a full level of government and does not have a fixed administrative or bureaucratic 
rank like its other counterparts (Lam & Lo, 2010). That is to say, the development of 
an urban district mainly depends on the city in which it is located.  
Before the economic reform, the growth of urban districts was relative stable due to 
the same stability of other types of jurisdictions in the country. Since the 1980s, many 
newly founded prefecture-level cities had sought to establish districts, although they 
had low urbanisation rate. At the end of 2007, 856 urban districts were located in 
China’s 287 cities, compared with 511 in 1980, and 275 in 1949 (Dai, 2000). The 
quick development of urban districts has happened not only because of the newly cre-
ated cities but also due to the growth in size of existing cities through annexation of 
suburban counties.  
An important change to the development of urban districts is the reconfiguration of 
the suburban districts (Lam & Lo, 2010). During the socialist era, suburban districts, 
called jiaoqu in Chinese, existed in a different way from other urban districts. A typi-
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cal difference lies in the large size of the jiaoqu, in sharp contrast to other urban dis-
tricts. For example, the Suburban District of Hefei City, which is the provincial capi-
tal in Anhui Province, is 516 km² while the combined area of the city’s three urban 
districts was 61 km². Moreover, as the name indicates, in most cases, the suburban 
district surrounds the urban centre area in the form of a concentric circle. Since the 
suburban district functions primarily as a rural area, the geographical structure of ‘en-
circling cities by the countryside’ (nongcun baowei chengshi) was seen as a strategic 
tactic during the Maoism. In the reform era, however, it was realized that due to the 
significant disparities in population density, administered land area, and socio-
economic development between urban core and suburban district, this spatial configu-
ration severely constrained urban development. As a result, cities started to abolish 
the suburban district for urban expansion and city growth. The typical approach was 
to abolish the suburban district, carve up it to several pieces, and incorporate each 
piece into different urban centre districts. After that, the city had more territories for 
urban construction without requiring more administrative jurisdiction. By 2000, only 
33 cities (excluded county-level ones) in China had suburban districts and the case 
study city Bengbu in this research was one of them (Liu & Wang, 2001).  
Urban districts restructuring has also been used for consolidating regional advantages 
and satisfying the new demand in urban development through combining or repealing 
some districts under the jurisdiction of a city (Yin & Luo, 2013). For example, in 
2010, Beijing municipal government was approved to combine Dongcheng District 
with Chongwen as well as Xicheng District with Xuanwu. According to media re-
ports, this decision was made by Beijing government in the hope of decreasing the 
restriction of limited geographical area, increasing the provision of public service, 
strengthening the protection of the historical city centre, and improving the efficiency 
of administrative management.  
Another scenario under which districts are restructured is that some urban districts 
share similar urban functions but each of them occupies only a small area. In order to 
improve management efficiency, the municipal government requests to merge such 
neighbouring districts.  For example, Nanshi District and Luwan District under the 
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municipality of Shanghai were merged to Huangpu District in 2000 and 2001 respec-
tively, and the enlarged district has become one of the most famous tourist and com-
mercial areas in China. This can also be seen in the case of Suzhou where three old 
urban districts were merged into one Gusu District in 2012. The most important rea-
son behind this merge in Suzhou was to protect the ancient city, along with other rea-
sons such as alleviating the difficulties of the small-size limitation and weak fiscal 
capacity. Typically, the new districts are substantially larger in geographical size 
compared to the old ones.  
Urban districts reconfiguration is expected to pave the way for regional cooperation 
and coordination (Wang, Wang, & Zhang, 2008).  Moreover, the municipal-level 
government is in high hopes that different districts within a city can be functionally 
organised, particularly in terms of the distribution pattern of industrial development 
considering the need for economic growth (Yin & Luo, 2013). Nowadays, there are 
three types of urban districts in major cities (Liu & Wang, 2001): Those located in the 
city core which already existed before the urban expansion, those developed from the 
suburban district, and those converted from the county as previously mentioned. Ap-
parently, not all Chinese cities at or beyond prefecture-level have all three types and 
the third type mainly exists in mega-cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. 
Since districts may have different levels of urbanisation and are diversified in all so-
cial, cultural, and economic terms, urban governance strategies in one may not apply 
to others.  In the process of establishment and development of urban districts, unlike 
super-large and large cities that have a strong incentive to concentrate more power 
and resources, other cities may have less to offer and therefore, face an uncertain fu-
ture (Lam & Lo, 2010). 
3.2 The implication of administrative restructuring on China’s city size 
distribution 
Regardless of which kind of city-driven administrative reform has been adopted and 
how the (sub)urban districts have been carved up, the general result is that the scale of 
China’s urban area has expanded substantially. The increase in the number and geo-
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graphical area of cities has important implications for city size distribution. In China, 
city size usually refers to urban population (Bai, Shi, & Liu, 2014; State Council, 
2014b; Chen et al., 2015). Being no longer incapable of adapting to the new urbanisa-
tion development, the standards for categorising city sizes have been adjusted by the 
State Council in order to further and effectively implement the categorised admin-
istration of population of cities and satisfy the new demands of socio-economic de-
velopment (State Council, 2014b). What is noteworthy is compared with three dec-
ades ago, the threshold of 50,000 has changed to the maximum population of small 
cities from the minimum population of large cities. The new standards rank cities into 
five classes and seven grades (table 4). According to the sixth national population 
census, which is the most recent one published in 2010, there are six metropolises, 10 
megalopolises, 124 large cities, 138 medium-sized cities, and 380 small-sized cities in 
China. Figure 3 shows population density and spatial distribution of cities in China in 
2010. It is worth pointing out that in the eastern part of the mainland, 36% of the na-
tion’s land supports 96% of the population (Bai, Shi, & Liu, 2014). 
Figure 3. Population density and spatial distribution of cities in China  
Source: Bai et al. (2014); revised by the author. 
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Table 4.Categories of city size in China according to the 2014 criteria  
Source: State Council, 2014b 
 
Zhou, Dai, and Bu (2013) argue that from 1949 to the present, the policies issued by 
the central governments have played an important role in retaining or enhancing the 
economic vitality of some cities in certain sizes, levels, and geographical areas. This 
can be seen in both the evolution of urban population size distribution and the spatial 
distribution of different-sized cities. In Mao’s era, small cities were created in the 
central and western regions for national defence, science and technology, industry, 
and transportation at the expense of the eastern coast. The growth control over large 
cities was taken as rhetoric because as key nodes of the centrally planned economy, 
they still dominated the urban hierarchy established by the Maoist regime (Lin, 2001). 
The total number of cities has grown rapidly from 193 to 658 (county-level cities in-
cluded) between 1978-2010 as a consequence of turning prefectures into cities and 
abolishing county and establishing city. Figure 4 displays the evolution of urban pop-
ulation size distribution, showing that the percentage of the population living in cities 
with less than 500,000 urban population size decreased to 43.6% while the proportion 
of the population in megacities increased. Behind this evolution, the national urban 
development policy has been shifted from ‘control the size of large cities, develop the 
medium-sized cities in an appropriate extent and enhance the urbanisation of small 
cities’ in 1980, to ‘strictly control the size of large cities and develop medium-sized 
and small cities to an appropriate extent’ in 1990 and ‘the coordinated development 
of large, small- and large-sized cities and small towns’ in 2000. After the reform and 
opening up, China made great efforts to establish special economic zones as a means 
of promoting spatial clustering or agglomeration. The importance attached by the cen-
tral government has been gradually transferred to the eastern region especially the 
coastal area. Jointly, it led to a large number of small- and medium-sized cities 
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emerging in the coastal area such as the Bohai Bay Economic Zone, the Yangtze Riv-
er Delta, and the Pearl River Delta (figure 5).  
 
Figure 4. Evolution of urban population size distribution 




Figure 5. China’s major economic zones: Bohai Bay Economic Zone, the YRD and the PRD 
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An unavoidable feature of urban growth that is worthy of note is that large and small-
sized cities do not grow in the same way and both endogenous and exogenous factors 
account for the difference. Central government policies largely dominate the exoge-
nous part. In the post-reform era, the modified city qualification criteria and the up-
grading of counties to county-level cities resulted in a large increase in the number of 
small-sized cities but a decrease in average city size (Xu & Zhu, 2009). At the same 
time, the annexation of some suburban districts and upgrading counties into prefec-
ture-level cities led to the considerable expansion of large cities. However, decision 
makers largely ignore the variation of endogenous resources in different localities.  
Location is a very important endogenous resource in this context, and those localities 
enjoying a close geographical proximity to regions have undergone rapid economic 
growth such as Hong Kong and Shanghai (Chan & Yao, 2010; He, Wei, & Xie, 
2008). The rapid development of small-sized cities was in fact an explicit policy ob-
jective in the early reform phase, and large cities have been expected to bring positive 
externalities to surrounding cities and towns. From the perspective of policy makers, 
large cities surrounded by small-sized cities are conducive to the formation of reason-
able urban agglomerations. Generally speaking, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River 
Delta can be seen as successful practices in this context for not only the core cities 
having achieved a certain level of economic growth, but also the surrounding small-
sized cities experiencing rapid development (Chien, 2013; Ye, 2013). Nevertheless, it 
is not the same for central and western China. Although the Chinese government has 
made great strides to develop infrastructure to attract investment to the western region 
and local cadres have made many efforts to attract business, foreign direct investment 
still plays a minor role in its urban growth and expansion (Schneider, Chang, & 
Paulsen, 2015). After several times of administrative restructuring, the municipality 
of Chongqing comprises 21 districts (and 17 counties and autonomous counties), 
which has an total area of 824,000 km². The economy in Chongqing has been grow-
ing rapidly with a significant increase in the urbanisation rate. However, more than 
40% of its GDP is concentrated in less than 10% of its territory, which is the city’s 
metropolitan area only. In addition, 40% of the population live far away from the de-
veloped urban core and the urbanisation rate of the adjacent areas is lagging behind 
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Chongqing (Pu & Xiong, 2015). Compared to other developed regions, the area in 
which Chongqing is located is a typical representation of superposition of an area 
with the coexistence of a modern city, large agricultural areas, and mountains. It 
seems that the growth mode in the coastal area is hardly reproduced in the western 
area and the city-oriented urban restructuring is questionable. 
The criticism on the quality of China’s urbanisation is that the speed of the develop-
ment of cities is far behind the increasing urbanisation rate. To control the scale of 
megacities, Chinese leaders has reiterated the importance of promoting small- and 
medium-sized cities by issuing beneficial policies to these cities over recent years, 
showing their excessive concerns about possible negative effects associated with in-
creased city sizes such as congestion, pollution, and social problems. Xu and Zhu 
(2009) argue that these effects also depend to a great extent on the quality of urban 
planning and governance; there should be a scientific approach to weigh positive ex-
ternalities related to city size growth with negative externalities. It is reasonable that 
people are attracted by more job opportunities in the large cities although they have to 
endure higher living costs at the same time. The problem, however, lies in how to im-
prove public services and design economic incentives in the lagging regions including 
both small-sized cities and rural area. 
 
Chapter 4.  THEORETICAL DEBATES: THE STATE AND URBAN 
GOVERNANCE UNDER CHINA’S ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
A literature review of recent studies on China’s administrative restructuring can pro-
vide a fundamental understanding in terms of the administrative system in China, the 
theoretical baseline, the different types of its reforms, and the rationale behind these 
changes. Appendix 1 gives a brief synopsis of the relevant literature, and overall, 
three elements can be identified. First, although a growing body of information has 
become available on administrative restructuring in China during the past 20 years, 
most of the studies investigate administrative hierarchy at the national level with a 
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focus on cities. Second, there is no widely used theoretical baseline behind these re-
searches. Analytical framework has been built under such concepts as central-local 
relationship, state-market dilemma, institutional arrangement, scale relations, and pro-
growth urban governance theories. Third, a consensus has been reached that adminis-
trative restructuring is tightly related to China’s spatial transformation, economic re-
structuring, and urban development. Models such as administrative urbanisation and 
territorial urbanisation have been put forward to capture the importance of adminis-
trative restructuring in the whole urbanisation process (Cartier, 2015; Liu, Yin, & Ma, 
2012).  
With reference to the institutional arrangement, pro-growth urban governance theo-
ries, the scale perspective, and their implications in China’s urban studies, this paper 
attempts to investigate the motivations, processes, and results behind this government 
intervention in redrawing administrative boundaries of urban districts in Bengbu City, 
with a particular emphasis on the construction of a newly established urban district. It 
is envisioned that the three theoretical perspectives can be complementary to each 
other, compensating for each other’s weaknesses and outlining the key ideas that fa-
cilitate to understand this issue of administrative restructuring. 
4.1 Administrative system as a key part of the institutional arrangement 
Considerable critical attention has been paid to the role and impact of institutions on 
the socio-economic development of countries and regions. As “the rules of the game 
in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human in-
teraction” (North, 1990, p. 3), institutions can be referred to as a diversity of specific 
practices and context, consisting of formal rules, laws, and regulations as well as in-
formal norms, customs and habits. If organisations and their entrepreneurs are play-
ers, institutions are the rules of game.  
The transition of China, from encouraging regional egalitarianism, urban growth con-
trol, and self-reliance towards promoting growth and competitiveness through a de-
centralisation of power and marketisation of the economy, has been identified in a 
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large body of the academic literature (Fan, 1995; Lin & Wei, 2002; Oi, 1999). With-
out the shock therapy of complete privatisation in other formerly socialist countries, 
China’s development requires a deep understanding that goes beyond a preoccupation 
with specific foundations and allows initial institutional conditions to be valued 
(Naughton, 1994; Jefferson & Rawski, 1994; Qian & Xu, 1993). This is consistent 
with what North has suggested: There is often a path dependency derived from the 
historical evolution of the institutional environment that makes a difference to the fu-
ture developments (North, 1990). Proposed by China’s new leaders in the early re-
form era, a system governed by “rules, clear lines of authority, and collective deci-
sion-making institutions” was hoped to replace “the over concentration of power and 
patriarchal rule that had characterised China under Mao” (Shirk, 1993, p. 9). At the 
same time, the pre-existing institutional arrangement became the stones in the meta-
phor of the post-Mao era – Crossing the river by feeling for the stones underfoot 
(mozhe shitou guohe). Rather than a widely-held view emphasising the importance of 
proceeding in an incremental manner, Goldstein (1995) points out the other signifi-
cance in this metaphor is that if you cross a river guided by the stones, you are con-
strained by the existing stones somewhere in the river. China’s administrative system, 
as an essential proponent of the institutional structure of a country, is apparently one 
such stone in the wide river of its development (Bennett, 1997). 
In urban studies, the institutional perspective considers places not just as the spatial 
organisation of activities in a certain area, but also the social construction in which 
people can live, work, and communicate. Regarding administrative systems, formal 
institutions generally play a leading and irreplaceable role by guiding and regulating 
various kinds of redrawing local government boundaries (Meligrana, 2005). By and 
large, the senior government establishes rules and regulations for possible types of 
reform, but the process is initiated and implemented by other stakeholders, such as 
local government officials and private sector players. To some extent, informal insti-
tutions can also function, especially when customs and conventions are deeply em-
bedded in the organisational structure and local stakeholders need to directly inter-
vene in the decision and implementation process. 
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As a key part of institutional structure, administrative systems are commanded by 
various entities across the world. In the US and Canada, controls over annexation pol-
icy and activity are ceded to the states and provinces respectively. Therefore, the pro-
cedures for annexation and other approaches of redrawing boundaries may vary from 
region to region. The differences between the two neighbouring countries is that in 
the US, states can either directly adjust municipal boundaries or introduce regulations 
that local governments must follow (Lindsey, 2004). In Canada, power over all local 
matters are exclusively reserved for the provincial-level government; sub-provincial 
units of government are not recognised by the Constitution as an independent level of 
government, but perceived as creatures of the provinces (Fischler, Meligrana, & 
Wolfe, 2004). By comparison, local governments in Germany are considered as part 
of the Federal States instead of a distinct and separate form or level of government. 
Called “a middle-of-the-road strategy between the relatively radical course of large 
scale amalgamation”, the reforms pursued by the Federal States in Germany was “in-
cisive if not fundamental” because the functional scope of local governments is terri-
tory-based in the local government tradition (Wollmann, 2004, p.127). Korea’s expe-
rience is comparable to China’s in two ways. First, the urban-rural divide policies 
were once prevalent in Korea from the 1960s through the 1980s, after which time the 
rural integration policies started to dominate. Second, recent city expansion and city 
creation adopted in metropolitan areas, have been resulted from Korea’s phenomenal 
industrial growth and rapid urbanisation (Shin, 2004). It is generally agreed that the 
similarity shared by these developed countries is, over time, local people affected by 
‘redrawing government boundaries’ have been given greater opportunities to have 
their voices heard and participate. Such underlying methods include direct involve-
ment such as public hearings, local referendums, and the election of mayors, which is 
an important institutional device in modern democratic nations to realize stakehold-
ers’ rights.  
In China’s case, the administrative hierarchy is seen as the state’s trans-historical in-
stitution (Cartier, 2005). Although China has decentralised much of its administrative 
authority and fiscal autonomy to local governments in the post-reform period, the 
central state remains influential and decisive in the hierarchical administrative sys-
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tem. In the ‘Regulations on the Management of Administrative Division’ published 
by the State Council in 1985, it stated that the establishment, dissolution, rename, and 
change of subordination of counties and cities should be examined and approved by 
the State Council. The provincial governments, however, are authorised by the State 
Council to approve a city’s partial boundary modifications. Although not autonomous 
in redrawing the territorial boundary, municipal governments play an active role in 
the process of administrative restructuring. In many instances, city designation, an-
nexation, and district restructuring are bottom-up initiatives from municipal govern-
ments for the purpose of local development. After the proposal, the administrative 
restructuring process would be formally undertaken following the procedures re-
quired by higher-level governments. Although public participation is weak and open 
debate is rare, social conflicts still exist (example: p.24). 
The system of administrative divisions in China has been widely challenged in public. 
In a presentation marking the opening of the 1st Strait Forum (an annual forum be-
tween mainland China and Taiwan), Long Yongtu, the former vice-minister of com-
merce, observed the limitations of administrative divisions in China’s economic de-
velopment. Long (2009) explained, “Regional cooperation has become the main trend 
of global economic development” He continued, “however, China has to overcome 
the obstacles resulting from administrative divisions” (Long, 2009). Similarly, as cit-
ed in Cartier (2015), a professor in the Institute of Chinese History and Geography at 
Fudan University, who observed how the party-state uses administrative means to 
solve developmental problems, argued that “a true market economy has nothing to do 
with the administrative divisions” (Zhou, 2012). 
Taking the decentralization process as a formal institutional change, another two sub-
stantial reforms can also be seen which are related to our discussion on administrative 
restructuring: one is that the central state gradually distributed the urban land control 
to municipalities through authorizing land leasing and granting planning permissions 
(Wu, 1999); the other is the introduction of the new tax-sharing system in the year of 
1994, in which land leasing fee is entitled to local government (Fang & Zhang, 2003; 
Wu, 2002; Zhu, 1999). In China, the Constitution stipulates that state has the de jure 
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ownership of urban land and rural land belongs to the collective; moreover, the Land 
Management Law specifies that the state can requisition any land when it is in the 
public interest in which process local states become the de facto landowner of their 
jurisdictions (Xu, Yeh, & Wu 2009). However, the existing evidences in China show 
that in the name of public interest, and driven by pecuniary benefits, some local gov-
ernments expropriate collective-owned farmland in rural areas and transfer it to state-
owned urban land, generating many injustices socially, economically, and environ-
mentally (Hsing, 2006). 
Rather than its existence, the form and dynamics of institutions and their role in eco-
nomic development attract noteworthy attention. China’s institutional development is 
deeply ingrained in the changing nature of the state, triggering debates on how old 
institutions, which were major factors of the planning economy, are still in power and 
shaping the economic reforms in the transition process (Zhu, 2000; Grewal, Cheng &, 
Rasmussen, 2015). As such, the transition of planned socialism toward market social-
ism under a vaguely defined socialist market economy is seen “as a result of competi-
tion and cooperation between interests and rationality of the status quo and forward-
looking forces” (Zhu, 2000, p. 180). When the market force becomes a major factor 
conditioning economic development, getting incentives right is extremely important 
because individuals are assumed to rationally act to maximise their utility. It is also 
important to alter incentives for both private and public sectors (Walder, 1995). 
Meanwhile, new institutions should bring an effective incentive structure towards the 
achievement of Pareto efficiency. Intriguingly, however, the vested interests of status 
quo seem to thwart this improvement.  
4.2 Pro-growth urban governance strategies in transitional Chinese cities 
Diversified motivations and partnerships result in different urban development poli-
cies with varying outcomes (Zhang, 2002). ‘Pro-growth’ is used to characterise the 
alliance built by different interest groups, legally and illegally, for pursuing their joint 
maximum profit (Ma, 2004). In the last decade, a growing body of literature has in-
vestigated the pro-growth coalition in China, emphasising the changing key stake-
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holders and the pragmatic evidences. Before the 1980s reform, the pro-growth coali-
tion led by the central government only consisted of various levels of the state (Zhu, 
1999; 2000). Under the marketisation in the post reform era, non-public sectors have 
started to challenge the position of the public sector, although the latter one still re-
mains in power in key development resources such as land and political decisions 
(Zhang, 2002). This term has been used in such concepts as the ‘growth machine’ 
(Logan & Molotch, 1987), ‘urban regime’ (Stone, 1989), and ‘urban entrepreneurial-
ism’ (Harvey, 1989) which were developed first to understand American urban politi-
cal economy. Although the concepts cannot be directly applied to China, they have 
been proven helpful in analysing urban development strategies of Chinese cities 
(Chien, 2013; Ma, 2004; Zhang, 2002; Zhang, 2014; Zhu, 1999). With reference to 
the three theories and their implication in China’s urban studies, we aim to better un-
derstand the dynamics of administrative restructuring and investigate the motivations, 
processes, and results behind this government intervention in redrawing administra-
tive boundaries. 
• Growth Machine Theory and Urban Regime Theory 
 ‘Growth machine,’ which has been widely observed in the urban renewal and rede-
velopment programs in the American cities during the post-World War II era, is be-
lieved to have significant impacts on urban development (Calavita, 1992; DeLeon, 
1992; Logan and Molotch, 1987). It originates form Molotch’s seminal article that 
“the political and economic essence of virtually any given locality, in the present 
American context, is growth” (Molotch, 1976, p. 310) and “a city is conceived as the 
areal expression of the interests of some land-based elite” (p. 309). The popularity of 
formatting growth coalitions comes from the reason that on the one hand, political 
elites attempt to promote economic growth, support public services and sustain fiscal 
health; on the other hand, local businesses seek to pursue profit by influencing local 
rules of land use, tax and employment policy, and provision of public services (Go-
tham, 2000). The desire for ‘growth’ creates a coalition that permeates all facets of 
local life, covering a wide range of coalition partners such as the political system, fi-
nance and banking industries, professional practices in law and planning, as well as 
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indirect beneficiaries of development like local media and utility companies (Logan 
& Molotch, 1987; Macleod, 2011; Molotch, 1976). The result of empirical tests is 
debatable; some supported the thesis (Clingermayer & Feiock, 1990; Lyon et al., 
1981) whereas others opposed it (Logan, Whaley, & Crowder, 1997; Schneider, 
1992). Although the adopted strategies in different pro-growth coalitions are contin-
gent upon a variety of local and external conditions (Gotham, 2000), the core ele-
ments are the same in all contexts: “the elite coalition, the self-interested promotion 
of urban growth, and the unequal benefits of this growth” (Kulcsar & Domokos, 
2005, p.550). However, this theory has been contended that the understanding of 
growth is oversimplification, the variations in regimes are under-examined, and the 
formation of local coalitions are often short sighted and seen as a means to reach re-
sources accumulation (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Logan, Whaley, & Crowder, 1997; 
Newman, 2001). 
The analytical focus of urban regime theory extends beyond property to take into ac-
count the general “informal arrangements by which public bodies and private inter-
ests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” 
(Stone, 1989, p. 6). In contrast with growth machine theory, which focuses on formal 
coalitions built upon the common goals of the economic and political sectors to pro-
mote urban growth, the goal of urban regime analysis suggests that a pro-growth coa-
lition often consists of local government and business groups in a more general sense 
(Stone, 1993; Stone & Sanders, 1987). Stone (1989) summarise four forms of power: 
systemic power related to the superior power in the socio-economic structure; com-
mand power associated with activities for a group to achieve domination in conflicts; 
coalition power involving bargaining activities; and pre-emptive power associated 
with strategically setting agendas. 
Zhu (1999, p. 537) first applies the two theories to China’s urban development analy-
sis and put forward three decentralisation forces behind the fact that “the most strik-
ing change having occurred is that Chinese governments at various levels are much 
more development-oriented and committed to growth than before”. First, the econom-
ic interests in fostering local economies are no longer limited to state-owned only. 
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Second, the increasing power of autonomy in state-owned enterprises promotes the 
efficiency of their functions. Third, the tax reforms, which rearrange central-local fis-
cal relations, are seen as incentives to local growth. Beyond the above, based on the 
1988 amended Constitution which allows land leasing with compensation, local gov-
ernments have started to treat lands within its administrative jurisdiction as an im-
portant resource for local development in the post-reform era. On the other hand, pri-
vate developers attempted to approach local governments for proposing cooperative 
development projects (Yang & Chang, 2007). Urban politicians tend to advocate 
land-centred urban development because land, through commodification, can gener-
ate revenue in the form of transaction fees, surcharges, and taxes (Hsing, 2006). 
In the last decade or so, many scholarly efforts have been made to study the implica-
tion of pro-growth coalitions in Chinese cities in the process of urban 
(re)development. Reviewing the history of Shanghai’s urban development, Zhang 
(2002) suggests a pro-growth coalition that was composed of different levels of state 
dominated before the reforms whereas the new coalition mainly consists of local gov-
ernment and both international and domestic non-state sectors. Through studying ur-
ban restructuring in Hangzhou, Qian (2012) investigates how a mutual beneficial rela-
tionship between the local government and the non-state actors has been developed in 
the establishment of development zones and new city projects, and points out this pri-
vate-public relationship may pose challenges on the central-local relationship in im-
plementing central policy in localities. Liu, Yin and Ma (2012) investigate how the 
local state has used the strong and highly visible hand in shaping local economic de-
velopment as well as in reconfiguring the city’s spatial patterns in the urbanisation 
process of Hebi City in Henan Province. Zhang (2014) analyses the applicability of 
growth machine theory with the case studies of Suzhou and Shenzhen, arguing that 
the strength of economic coalitions differs in the two cities due to different adminis-
trative status, local market conditions, and histories. These empirical evidences di-
rectly or indirectly suggest that the formation of economic coalitions seems to be sim-
ilar in both Chinese and American cities because the key actor controls the production 
resources even though to what extent the local state can be seen as the major stake-
holder varies from region to region. Nonetheless, unlike in the advanced economies 
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where local elections are held to encourage good political performance and a wide 
range of formal and informal institutions are involved in regulating the local devel-
opment, the one-party leadership and the appointment of officials directly under the 
leadership of the superior government make China fundamentally different in the po-
litical dimension of coalition building. 
Theoretically, Macleod and Goodwin (1999) argue that both growth machine theory 
and urban regime theory lack an analytical consideration into the spatiality of the 
state and the associated scaling of political representation. Applying their criticism 
into China’s practice, Shen (2007) further points out that although both theories are 
relevant to Chinese cities, they only focus on the coalitions that have emerged in ur-
ban transformation within cities while ignoring external forces at the national and 
global scales. He argues that the distinctive nature of rescaling process in Chinese 
cases compared with Western ones is that in China, intense interaction and negotia-
tion between the central and the local state have been actively shaping the arrange-
ment of the administrative system, and the central government often plays a decisive 
role in the final decision. Furthermore, in contrast with Western experiences which 
generally assume that there is only one local government exercising power in public-
private collaboration, there is more than one level of government in China’s urban 
development which may include municipal-level, district-level, and county-level. As 
such, in the third part of this chapter, a scale perspective will be discussed to over-
come the weakness of this approach.    
• Urban Entrepreneurism 
Urban entrepreneurial strategies, which “typically rests on a public-private partner-
ship focusing on investment and economic development with the speculative con-
struction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as 
its immediate (though by no means) exclusive political and economic goal” (Harvey, 
1989, p. 8), are by and large applicable in the East and West of the World (Jessop and 
Sum, 2000; Wu, 2003). One stream of literature originating from advanced Western 
countries observes the transition of urban governance from managerialism to entre-
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preneurialism (Griffiths, 1998; Harvey, 1989; Quilley, 1999). Various motivations 
behind such a shift have been suggested by scholars, such as economic and political 
restructuring from Fordism to flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1989; Marcuse & van 
Kempen, 2000), the necessity to increase local revenues (Peterson, 1981), and a series 
of political factors (Stone, 1987). Based on studies of Western cities, a list of charac-
teristics associated with urban entrepreneurialism can be summarised: the primacy of 
economic growth over social welfare, the emerging alliance of public-private partner-
ships (PPP) in urban development, and the increasing popularity of city marketing 
and promotion. City competitiveness and underlying approaches to promote it have 
grown side by side with the scope of urban entrepreneurialism. It is worth noting that 
there has been an expansion in how to conceptulise competitiveness from the relative 
abundance and cheap cost of various factors of production to complex forms of struc-
tural or systemic competitiveness, including extra-economic aspects such as public-
private partnerships, industry-finance relations, and governmental policies (Chesnais, 
1986; Jessop and Sum, 2000). 
In China, it is a widely held view that the local economic development in the post-
Mao economic transition was fuelled by urban entrepreneurial strategies at different 
levels (Huang, 2008; Qian, 2011; Shin, 2009). Regarding territorial competition 
among same-level governments, Chinese cities have behaved more competitive when 
vying with each other for development resources as well as developmental opportuni-
ties such as investments, skilled labor, infrastructure construction, and large compa-
nies (Chien and Gordon, 2008). As a result of municipal governments gaining urban 
land control through “authorising land leasing and granting planning permissions” 
(Wu, 1999, p. 8), the construction of real estate has become an important entrepre-
neurial undertaking. Ding and Licktenberg (2008, p. 1) point out that in eastern and 
central China, the urban land produces “far more income per unit area” than agricul-
tural land, “suggesting that local governments can profit substantially from conver-
sion of farmland to urban use”. Even in terms of increasing affordable housing provi-
sions and adopting a socially inclusive urban policy, the interests of local residents 
have been largely set aside compared with the top priority in fostering economic 
growth through real estate development (He & Wu, 2005). Eventually, a shift to em-
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phasis on equity is mainly a rhetoric of political slogan which facilitates urban 
(re)development, safeguards land-based interests, and accelerates economic growth 
(Shin, 2009). Like their counterparts in Western countries (Hiller, 2000; Kotler, Ham-
lin, Rein, & Haider, 2002; Loftman & Nevin, 1996), cities in China have also adopted 
profit-motivated strategies through place marketing, prestige projects, or mega events 
(Qian, 2011; Shin, 2014; Xu & Yeh, 2005). However, there are many variations 
among different cities in the contexts and motivations behind the development of 
such strategies and how they are implemented along with what the consequences are. 
This is particularly true in China considering it has a mixed economy in which social-
ist legacies exist side by side with market forces (Fan & Scott, 2003). Despite becom-
ing entrepreneurial in nature, local governments are still constrained by the strong 
involvement of the state economically and politically (Xu & Yeh, 2005).  
In the past decade, the second phase of urban entrepreneurial strategies has been iden-
tified in the developed region of China. Instead of phasing out the previous prevailing 
concepts such as profit-driven, public-private collaboration and territorial competi-
tion, the salient features of the second phase are characterised by the emergence of a 
more coordinated and cooperative form of urban entrepreneurialism (Chien and Wu, 
2011). A typical example is the cross-border land-related development coalition, 
which is taken as a strategic approach for tackling resource constraints and uneven 
development in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta (Chien, 2013; Chien 
and Wu, 2011; Luo and Shen, 2007, 2009; Yang, 2006). At the national level, China’s 
economy remains rigid, and the economic activities at the higher administrative level 
are quite related to the variations at the lower level. Therefore, territorial cooperation 
at municipal- or county-level can by no means achieved without institutional assis-
tance from upper-level governments. 
4.3 China’s administrative division system: a scale perspective 
In recent years, the scale theory has received significant recognition. The fact that the 
adjustment of scale boundaries and the production of new scales are able to influence 
socio-economic transformation has never ceased to intrigue scholars and policy-
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makers (Agnew, 1993; Brenner, 1999; 2001; Swyngedouw, 1997). Although China is 
distinguished by a strong legacy of its socialist history, many scholars have applied 
the theoretical debates on the nature of scale emerging in Western countries into Chi-
na’s context, and argue that the administrative rank of territorial units in China should 
be incorporated in the theorisation of scales (Cartier, 2001; Ma & Wu, 2004; Ma, 
2005; Shen, 2004a). In general, the dimensions of scale in urban study can be under-
stood as city-hinterland relationships, central city-outer city relationships, and city 
hierarchy (Agnew, 1993). Unlike recent theoretical debates that are focused on the 
relationship among the global, national, regional, and local geographical scales 
(Brenner, 2001; Swyngedouw, 1997), the application of scale theory in China is pri-
marily concerned with scale as levels and as relations in two ways. The first one is 
based on the territorial units in China’s administrative system such as towns, counties, 
cities, provinces, and the state, and the other sees urban areas and rural areas as two 
different categories of development. Four fundamental reasons contribute to the ra-
tionale behind these emerging research interests in China. First, the state-created ad-
ministrative hierarchy in China, which has been maintained over longue durée, shares 
the common nature with scale theory because both recognise that territories are multi-
layered and can be produced through historical conditions and practices (Cartier, 
2005). Similarly, the administrative restructuring can be understood as an urban 
rescaling strategy for both attached physical localities and linked political institutions 
(Macleod & Goodwin, 1999). Second, each territorial unit within the administrative 
system as a particular type of scale can engender significant ramifications upon local 
economic development (Ma, 2005). Third, the significance is also manifested by the 
proliferation of the interaction of scales (Shen, 2004a). For example, a municipal city 
in China is under the administration of a province, but it also possesses certain power 
over its subordinate administrative units such as districts, counties and towns. Last 
but not least, due to the household registration system (hukou), different levels of so-
cial prestige and economic development in urban and rural areas can respectively rep-
resent a particular type of scale as level (Howitt, 1988). Compared with the produc-
tion of scale by the state, Cartier (2005, p. 29) differentiates the significance of the 
politics of scale lies in “distinct state actors and institutions, acting out goals, policies, 
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and ideologies in scale contexts” such as the fiscal system. As the 1994 tax reform 
rescaled the fiscal responsibility, local governments in China have gradually lost their 
revenue. Each sub-national government needs to consider their independent budget. 
This analysis corresponds with the essentiality of discussing administrative restructur-
ing from institutional perspective and pro-growth coalition urban strategies. 
Howitt (1988) argues that scale possesses at least three interacting structural ele-
ments: size, level and relation. Taking the first two components alone might result in 
a simplification of scale whereas understanding scale as relational could complicate 
the concept. The implication of this complexity lies in the interrelations among multi-
ple-scale positions and resources that circulate through them. Scale relations reflected 
by a typical sketch of the administrative hierarchy in China are believed to be much 
more intricate than they look (Cartier, 2005). As Cartier (2005, p. 22) further ex-
plains, “a scale perspective does not assume that processes necessarily move up and 
down a territorial hierarchy, but recognise that social processes may move unevenly 
across a space and sometimes ‘jump’ scales”. This viewpoint echoes with what is 
consistent among global scholars: Scale should not be seen as a given category, but 
instead scaled places are “the embodiment of social relations of empowerment and 
disempowerment, and the arena through and in which they operate” (Swyngedouw, 
1997, p. 169). In other words, beyond territories defined by political boundaries, 
scales also act as a set of processes, constituting social relations among people at dif-
ferent discrete levels such as household, neighbourhood, workplace, institution, and 
region (Marston, 2000).  
During the Maoist period, the central state was seen as the sole preeminent scale that 
played an irreplaceable role. In the implementation of the centrally designed national 
development strategy, the central state was the only key actor and major beneficiary 
of state development, with other administrative units such as province, prefecture, and 
county-level governments serving as links in the administrative chain of command 
(Ma, 2005). Before the economic reform, the central state promoted a series of egali-
tarian policies aimed to alleviate regional disparity and pursue a balanced develop-
ment structure (Chen, 1991). Moreover, urban and rural were considered as binary 
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opposites in local economic development. The main function of the city was to pro-
mote industrial development while that of the rural area was to encourage agricultural 
production. 
Although the administrative hierarchy is seen as a system of geographical scales that 
the central government has historically created, it produces dynamic and uneven forc-
es with varying priority of associated scale, power, and resources (Cartier, 2005). In 
the post-1978 reform era, China’s administrative structure has been rescaled in a di-
rection that focuses on the cities as the main economic driving force. The city has 
been seen as an important administrative unit since it is “not only the executive arm 
of the People’s Congress of a city but also the local administrative arm of the state” 
(Shen 2004a, p. 44). In addition to generating administrative changes at the city level, 
this reorientation process involves a reshuffling of decision-making power from verti-
cal authorities based on central ministries to horizontal authorities based on local ad-
ministrative units (Ma, 2005). City-level in China consists of four different adminis-
trative ranks, including the centrally administered municipalities or province-level 
cities, subprovince-level cities, prefecture-level cities and county-level cities (Cartier, 
2005). The last classification, county-level cities, are not permitted to establish urban 
districts and often have substantially fewer government unites compared to other 
kinds. 
In pursuit of particular political and economic goals, the arrangement of China’s ad-
ministrative divisions at the city level has been periodically adjusted and changed by 
the state, including the conceptualisation, the physical size, and the population. In the 
1980s and 1990s, the state revised the criteria of city designation three times mainly 
on the non-agricultural population and the gross domestic product (GDP) (Liu & 
Wang, 2001). The current formal institution on the administrative designations of pre-
fecture-level cities is the 1993 criteria issued by the Ministry of Civic Affairs with 
approval from the State Council (table 5). 




Table 5. State Council criteria for statutory designation of prefecture-level cities as of 1993 
Source: State Council (1993) 
 
From 1949 to 2003, the number of prefecture-level cities has increased sharply from 
53 to 282. Moreover, the number of county-level cities has increased to 374, making 
the total 660, including another four province-level cities (China State Statistical Bu-
reau, 2004). The reason behind this rapid growth of cities is the focus on cities as the 
engines of economic development in the reform era. This has been implemented 
through divergent restructuring strategies of administrative system. Chung (2007) ar-
gues that the Chinese state plays a vital role in producing and rearranging urban scale 
for political and economic purposes through administrative measures. Referring to the 
theory of scale, Shen (2007, p. 47) divides the administrative measures into two cate-
gories: “vertical rescaling refers to a change in the administrative status of a city 
while horizontal territorialisation refers to the expansion in city’s administrative ar-
ea”. Additionally, regional mergers, in which one area expands and the other is re-
pealed, are also emblematic for administrative restructuring.  
 
Chapter 5.  A CASE STUDY: BENGBU AND ITS TWO ADJUSTMENTS IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE TERRITORY 
5.1 The background behind administrative restructuring in Bengbu 
Bengbu, selected as an empirical study for this research, is an inland city located in 
the east of China (figure 6). Its name means ‘Oyster Wharf’ in Chinese, echoing its 
former reputation as a freshwater pearl fishery. In the late 1970s, Bengbu was listed 
as an important industrial city by the State Council and allocated many heavy indus-
try projects. Based on land reform and agricultural development, Bengbu was also 
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one of the national grain depots and an interchange for food industry. The most im-
portant place-specific feature behind this central state strategy is the significant ad-
vantage of railway transportation. Since Tianjin-Pukou Railway which is the main 
section of current Jinghu Railway brought into service in 1912, Bengbu has become 
an important goods distribution centre and traffic hub in both waterway and landway 
in China. As such, Bengbu is called a city brought by train (huoche lalai de chengshi). 




Figure 6. Bengbu City Geographical Location Map 
Source: Bengbu Urban Development Strategic Plan (Tongji, 2010); revised by the author. 
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Since its reform and opening to the outside world more than 30 years ago, China has 
achieved rapid economic development. In this process, the development of state-
owned economy has been negatively connected with the degree of marketisation 
(CNSA, 2004). The allocation of state-owned heavy industry during the planned 
economy has been a drag to the development of Bengbu’s market economy. When 
other cities in Anhui Province such as Hefei and Wuhu in the developed coastal area 
promptly responded to marketisation and decentralisation, Bengbu had a lack of ca-
pacity and flexibility in endogenous development. From 1980 to 2012, the GDP rank 
of Bengbu significantly declined at provincial level (table 6). When reviewing the 
development path of Bengbu City, five important reasons can be identified to explain 
this drop-off (Tsinghua, 2010): (1) the geographical size of urban districts is relative-
ly small, restricting Bengbu’s urban development and industrial restructuring; (2) the 
development of state-owned enterprises dominates Bengbu’s economic performance 
but the role of foreign invested companies is marginal; (3) it is unlikely to achieve 
regional coordinated development because of the weak economic foundation in 
neighbouring cities such as Huainan and Sùzhōu; (4) Bengbu is in the early phase of 
industrialisation because there are redundant labour forces in the rural area and the 
development of secondary and tertiary industries are still sluggish; (5) spatial devel-
opment of Bengbu City is restricted by the adjacent area, resulting in irrational ar-
rangement of living environment and industrial production which trigger a series of 
social and environment problems. 
Since the State Council and the People’s Government of Anhui Province approved on 
city administering counties (shi guan xian) by placing three neighbouring counties 
under Bengbu’s administrative purview in 1983, the GDP percentage of agricultural 
industry increased in the 1980s. Both the GDP percentage of agricultural output and 
the proportion of the population working in the primary industry in Bengbu were 
higher compared with provincial and national levels during 1995 to 2003 (Bengbu 
Statistical Bureau, 2004). At the same time, the rural enterprises started to grow and 
the labour surplus gradually moved to the secondary and tertiary industries.  




Table 6. Bengbu’s GDP ranking, GDP proportion and labour force percentage in three industries 
Source: Bengbu Statistic Bureau (2013) 
5.2 Implementation process 
In China, the decision-making process of administrative restructuring does not con-
sult local residents in impacted jurisdiction and issue public documents in advance 
(Cartier, 2015). In general, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (a state bureaucracy) an-
nounces the outcomes of administrative restructuring including place name, type of 
change, and date of confirmation by the State Council in its official website. Article 
89 of the Constitution states the State Council possesses the decision-making power 
to change the administrative divisions of provinces, municipalities, and counties. At 
the same time, the State Council authorizes the governments of provinces, autono-
mous regions, and state direct-controlled municipalities to approve (partial) changes 
to administrative territorial divisions in counties, urban districts, and municipalities. 
Without exception, the administrative restructuring in Bengbu is mostly a municipal 
government intention with the approval of upper-level governments. Due to its large-
scale, it is the State Council that approved the first administrative restructuring in 
2004. Intriguingly, Bengbu municipal government decided to process the second ad-
ministrative restructuring, which was to annex two villages, in different times. As 
such, they could apply for this change through Anhui provincial government instead 
of going through the long processing time required by the State Council because the 
provincial government can only approve one village at one time (060220151).





Figure 7. Implementation processes of two adjustments in Bengbu’s administrative territory 
Source: Bengbu Civil Affairs Bureau (2014); compiled by the author. 
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The constraint of ‘encircling cities by the rural area’ (nongcun baowei chengshi) in all 
geographical, demographical, economic, and social terms is seen as the foremost 
challenge for Bengbu’s urban development before implementing administrative re-
structuring process for the first ime (interview 25032014). In 1985, the total area of 
the three central districts was less than 40km² while the Suburban District was more 
than 400km² (Bengbu Chronicle Committee, 1995). Apparently, this layout was un-
sustainable and unbalanced for the city development (figure 7 left up). In response to 
the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’ proposed by the 16th Central Committee of 
the Community Party of China in 2003, which aimed to advocate and promote a 
comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development scheme, the People’s Gov-
ernment of Bengbu Municipality made a proposal to State Council on adjusting the 
division of its administrative districts (interview 25032014). On 10 January 2004, the 
State Council approved the proposal on Bengbu’s districts restructuring (qu hua 
chong zu), which brought a new chapter to this city’s development. During the first-
time territorial adjustment, this restructuring process annexed 156km² of land from its 
three counties, leading the urban districts to 601.5km². In addition, names of all the 
districts were changed based on local history and natural resources instead of previ-
ous locational meaning: from Suburban District to Huaishang District, from East Dis-
trict to Longzi Lake District, from Middle District to Bengshan District, and from 
West District to Yuhui District. This process also divided the Suburban District into 
four blocks (figure 7 right up), three of which were integrated with the urban centre 
districts in the city south and a new administrative district called Huaishang District 
was built up on the north bank of the Huai river (figure 7 left bottom). It is worth 
mentioning that the Huai river, with a length of 1,110 km, is a major river in China, 
flowing through southern Henan province, northern Anhui Province, and northern 
Jiangsu Province. The land use spatial evolution in the urban districts of Bengbu City 
is seen as an along-river evolutionary process (figure 8). 
 
 




Figure 8. Land use spatial evolution in the urban districts of Bengbu City 
Source: Bengbu Urban Development Strategic Plan (Tsinghua, 2014); compiled by the author. 
 
 
Between March 2013 and April 2014, Bengbu implemented the second administrative 
restructuring –annexing part of suburban counties by cities (bin xian ru shi) under 
dual approvals from provincial government (Figure 7 right bottom). Prior to the re-
structuring, the total area of urban districts was 601.5 km², ranked second to last on 
the provincial level. Refer to figure 9, the 601.5 km² was the 2014 urban districts 
without Mohekou Township Administrative Area in the right top corner and Macheng 
Township Administrative Area in the bottom left corner. The figures in table 7 show 
the data of key economic factors in Bengbu. The increase rate of agricultural industry 
has been much slower compared with secondary and tertiary industries, and the sec-
ondary industry enjoyed the fastest growth rate. Moreover, although both the gov-
ernment expenditure and government revenue significantly boosted, the fiscal gap 
between the two numbers also remarkably increased. 




Figure 9. Administrative divisions of urban districts in Bengbu City, 2014 




Table 7. The figures of key economic factors in Bengbu, 2005-2014 
Source: Bengbu Municipal Statistic Bureau (2014) 
5.3 The construction of a new district: challenges and strategies 
In its quest to catch up economically, the local state of Bengbu decided to establish a 
new district on the north bank of the Huai river, where the economic foundations and 
development opportunities were far from satisfactory and lagging behind other dis-
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tricts. For a long time, Suburban District, based on which a new district was built up, 
had been considered as the pillar of the primary industry in Bengbu and the important 
agricultural area in Anhui Province. Driven by economic reform, the development 
strategy in Suburban District has gradually shifted to ‘strengthen industry, promote 
commerce and trading, as well as maintain agriculture (qianggong xingshang wen-
nong)’. In 2001, the GDP in the three sectors in Suburban District were 22%, 49%, 
and 29% respectively, with a great increase in the secondary and tertiary sectors com-
pared with the old time.  
The districts restructuring (quhua chongzu) implemented in 2004 completely changed 
the jurisdiction and the size of Suburban District, and a new Huaishang District was 
established with the total area of 236.5 km². From 2013 to 2014, Huaishang District 
further annexed Mohekou Town from Wuhe County, enlarging its geographical area 
to 403 km².  
5.3.1 The formation of a new government 
It was not easy to develop a new district a river away from the city centre. When the 
municipal government led the efforts to construct Huaishang District, the first chal-
lenge was the formation of a new government (interview 10022015). In general, ad-
ministrative authority at a higher status has decisive power to dismiss and appoint of-
ficials at the lower level, and this appointment normally takes place between two 
neighbouring levels of government. In general, decided by the municipal government, 
the district secretary of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the district chief of Chi-
nese government are the most important positions at the district level. Based on the 
interviews with district officials, the formation of a new Huaishang government, in 
particular the appointment of these two positions, was a deliberate decision by the 
municipal government: In the first term, the district secretary, who was shifted from 
the position of deputy secretary in the Party Working Committee at the municipal 
level, is considered as a person with strong awareness of reform and rich knowledge 
in the economic development of Bengbu.  
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I was surprised to know that I was the first choice of candidate for the district secre-
tary at that time because previously I had served in the bureau of electronic industry, 
development and reform commission, and economic and trade commission, all of 
which were at municipal level and related to industrial development instead of agri-
cultural production … To be honest, I even recommended the director of municipal 
agricultural commission to the mayor because traditionally this district was mainly 
an agricultural area and I thought they would arrange a person with knowledge and 
experience in agricultural development in this new district … It was not until I was 
told the first priority in Huaishang’s development was to functionally integrate into 
the urban area rather than to remain as a suburban agriculture area, that I realised 
why I was selected. (First-term secretary of Huaishang District, 2015) 
On the other hand, the district chief had worked as the vice secretary in the previous 
Suburban District and as a vice chief in Huaiyuan county before was appointed in the 
Huaishang District. Therefore, he was not only familiar with the local strengths and 
weaknesses but also experienced in the development and governance of the rural area. 
In such an arrangement, the appointments of an economic reformer from municipal 
government and a former local cadre from county government were widely acknowl-
edged among interviewed officials. Despite the fact that their jobs did not interact be-
fore establishing the new district, their cooperation was seen as a successful one. 
Very often in China, key local officials are appointed within their term of office for 
five years. It is widely criticised that the frequent change of political leaders can pro-
duce inconsistencies in local development strategy, making urban development less 
functional than prestigious (Cartier, 2005; Qian, 2013). The appointment of leader-
ship in Huaishang also follows this general five-year routine, but the impact of the 
first term has been substantial among local cadres. Since the new district was estab-
lished in 2004, there had been two times of political changes with three governments. 
Each government has been in charge during a certain time span. Instead of completely 
changes in key politicians, the ex-district chief has replaced the next round party sec-
retary twice. In China, major/chief is mainly responsible for all the administrative 
work while party secretary is in charge of ideological and political work, as well as 
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the general guidance. In this regard, the political arrangement in Huaishang is strate-
gic and thoughtful. 
Before 2004, the local cadres’ proficiency was in organizing agricultural production 
and arranging farmer’s activities. Therefore, the thorny question was how to redirect 
their thoughts from a rural to an urban perspective. The philosophy put forward by 
the first term secretary in managing local officials is that “give a man a fish and you 
feed him for a day, teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime” (interview 
10022015). He regularly organized formal meetings to introduce the mechanisms and 
influences of market economy and economic reform, in order to enable these people 
serving in the new district government to understand their challenges and to seek for 
corresponding solutions. According to a local reportage, the leadership of the first 
term secretary and chief not only made powerful influence on other local officials in 
their term of office, but also acted as role models for the following governments (Jin, 
2015).  
On the other hand, however, the participation of local residents in political affairs is 
rather limited. This can be seen from the feedback that most of the respondents re-
ported that they did participate throughout the development of the new district. More-
over, they expressed that the leadership transitions have made no influence on their 
lives. Although it is not unusual that the party secretary and mayor have great discre-
tion in urban development and city planning, it has been subjected to considerable 
criticism because the chance of promotion in the government administrative hierarchy 
is identified as a major reason behind rampant intercity competition through putting 
forward ambitious urban plans (Ye, 2001; Wu & Zhang, 2007). By appointing an ur-
ban governor who has expertise in economic reform and a rural cadre who is experi-
enced in leading local officials, the Bengbu municipal government intended to pro-
mote a revolutionary reform rather than remain on a traditional development path. 
The question is whether this development redirection is worthy and if the new district 
government can deliver an appropriate local economic development. 
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5.3.2 District positioning and economic restructuring 
Chinese cities are used to positioning themselves with reference to a famous global 
city or region. Examples can be seen as Geneva of the Orient called by Hangzhou 
City and Suzhou City, Little Paris of the Orient called by Harbin City, and Hollywood 
of the Orient called by Hengdian Village. To place itself as an important part for the 
municipality, Huaishang District has been continuously making efforts to strategically 
target a role model. When Huaishang was established in 2004, the district government 
proposed a slogan that “to create ‘Pudong’ in Bengbu” (interview 10022015). The 
rationale behind is although Pudong was an agricultural area in Shanghai for more 
than one century, government decisions and development policies made it an interna-
tional financial centre nowadays (Zhang, 2005). In 2003 when Anhui provincial gov-
ernment suggested that Bengbu should be developed as the central city in Northern 
Anhui even the Central Plains of China, Huaishang District was positioned as a sub-
centre in the city of Bengbu, a base for modern logistic, a processing industry hub and 
an agricultural tourism centre (interview 060220151).  
Every municipality has its own strategy to deal with institutional arrangement, urban 
planning, three industries, rural-urban integration, and ecological environment man-
agement. As one of the hundreds of municipalities in China, Bengbu has always fol-
lowed the national and provincial strategies especially the part particularly related to 
us. When we issue policies for our administrative districts, it should be strictly and 
carefully accorded with a series of top-down policies. (A vice mayor in Bengbu Mu-
nicipal Government, 2014) 
Urban development goals in Chinese cities have been constantly set and reset due to a 
mix of reasons such as changing socio-economic contexts, the analysis of city’s 
strengths and weaknesses, the challenges posed by surrounding regions, and the am-
bitions of local politicians (Qian, 2013). Huaishang District has also gone through a 
series of planning and development goals with similar and diverse foci. Since the dis-
trict was established in 2004, a general target of ‘urban-rural integration’ and a specif-
ic ‘one river and five functional sub-districts’ plan have been accepted, highlighting 
the district was expected to be functionally embedded in the urban area with the con-
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struction of a modern logistics park, a commercial residential area, a new site for edu-
cation, culture, and political purposes, an industrial park, and an ecological park. Pro-
jecting the future development in the initial phase is critical and important. On the 
other hand, the post-development goals were more like supplements to the original 
one rather than significantly influenced by the change of local politicians.  
Huai river horizontally divides the city to two parts, and the disparity between the 
two can be seen not only in the industrial and commercial environment, but also in 
the financial development and education condition. Therefore, how to make the over-
all development cross the river should be the main assignment for Bengbu. To 
achieve the goal, challenges lie in encouraging local population towards the produc-
tion of secondary and tertiary industries and transferring land from agricultural use 
to industrial construction. (First-term secretary of Huaishang District, 2015) 
The comparison between Current Land Use Condition in Huaishang District in 2009 
(figure 10) and Huaishang District Land Use Planning 2006-2020 (figure 11) reflects 
the substantial change in the land use of Huaishang. It can be clearly seen that, along 
the Huai river, a large sale of agricultural land was planned to be transferred for urban 
construction use. In addition, more construction land plots were scatteredly planned 
across large area of basic protected farmland zone. As a local key cadre commented, 
compared with other three districts in the old (even current) urban core area, the most 
remarkable comparative advantage of Huaishang is land, especially when it comes to 
industrial development (interview 060220151). For his understanding, “land makes 
everything possible”. 




Figure 10. Current Land Use Condition in Huaishang District, 2009 
Source: Bengbu Municipal Planning Bureau (2014); modified by the author. 




Figure 11. Huaishang District Land Use Planning, 2006-2020 
Source: Bengbu Municipal Planning Bureau (2014); modified by the author. 
 
In 2013, the administrative annexation allowed Huaishang to further occupy 167 km² 
Mohekou Town from Wuhe County (right top corner in figure 9). In the old time, 
Mohekou had rich local resources in agricultural production and was seen as a pro-
duction base for grain and meat. During the economic transition, the industrialisation 
in the rural area can strengthen the power of local government because a grain-based 
economy has few options in earning fiscal income (Oi, 1999). Wuhe County also ap-
plied this national trend and promoted its industrial development in the early 2000s. 
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In 2003, a county-level industrial park was established in Mohekou Town, which was 
gradually upgraded to a provincial-level economic and development zone in 2006. 
There have been signals of this annexation before its implementation in 2013. Alt-
hough being approved by Anhui provincial government in 2008, Bengbu City Master 
Plan (2008-2020) was brewed in 2000 and initiated in 2003 (Zhao, Wang, & Liu, 
2013). In this plan, Mohekou industrial park, as one of the only two parks in the 
Wuhe Economic and Development Zone, has been arranged as the potential reloca-
tion site for several state-owned chemical enterprises. The common characteristics 
among those enterprises are large-scale, heavily polluted, and previously located in 
the urban core area. In 2009, Bengbu municipal government issued a document that 
clearly put forward the ‘exit from urban and enter park (tui shi jin yuan)’ plan on 
chemical enterprises’ relocation and the detailed implementation. In order to corre-
spond to the national call on suppress the secondary industry and develop the third 
industry (tui er jin san) in the urban area, the municipal government of Bengbu at-
tempted to stimulate the real estate development in the old urban centre by relocating 
the heavily polluted, energy waste, and less profit industries. The rationale behind the 
annexation was to upgrade industrial structure as well as optimise industrial layout 
(interview 25032014). The administrative annexation was expected to provide more 
land for industrial development and urban expansion (interview 10022015).  
A local online forum of Bengbu offers an informative account, showing that people 
living in the city centre have a supportive attitude on the relocation of chemical enter-
prises (Bengbu Forum, 2011). However, when asked about this relocation proposal, 
local stakeholders living in Mohekou Town expressed great concerns over recent deg-
radation of their homeland’s environment including drinking water and air quality. 
Furthermore, since Bengbu is located in the middle of the Huai river, the habitant liv-
ing in the lower reaches may also be affected if pollution exists. The concern is not 
misplaced. Five years ago, the industrial pollution in Longzihu District of Bengbu 
City, where those state-owned chemical enterprises that are located in Huaishang Dis-
trict were placed before, once attracted global attention. The reason is that the docu-
mentary film ‘The Warriors of Qiugang’, which tells a story about how a group of 
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Qiugang villagers in Longzihu District of Bengbu City fought the poisoning of their 
land and water by three chemical plants, was nominated for an Oscar for best Docu-
mentary Short Subject. According to the released news (Xinhua, 2014), two chemical 
factories in Qiugang Village directly polluted 10 ponds and hundreds of acres of land 
because of excessive emissions and other pollution problems, resulting in quite a few 
people suffering from cancer and drawing considerable negative attention. Although 
the two factories were relocated to Huaishang District in 2008, no crops have been 
successfully grown in this area. This evidence of heavily polluted enterprises reloca-
tion resonates with Zhang’s (2005) argument that the public policy can produce not 
only the advantaged and disadvantaged residents but also the advantaged and disad-
vantaged regions.  
At the end of March 2014, Mohekou Town suggested a ‘four-in-one (si wei yi ti)’ 
strategic planning, which was to develop the chemical industry in the east, to reserve 
land for residential and public use in the west, to promote commercial district in the 
south, and to encourage agricultural production in the north. Shortly after the strategy 
was released, the municipal government formally launched the relocation of two 
large-scale and state-owned chemical enterprises from central districts to Mohekou 
industrial park. The existing literature shows a juxtaposition of agricultural, industrial, 
and residential and leisure activities in the urban periphery has been widely witnessed 
in Chinese cities, even cities in other Asian countries (McGee, 1989; Ma & Wu, 
2005). Apparently, creating many different kinds of functions in one locality can be 
unsustainable and irrational.  
It should be noted that the two adjustments in Bengbu’s administrative territory and 
related government-led industrial development in Huaishang District have dramatical-
ly changed local economic construction and promoted local economic growth (figure 
12). From 2004 to 2014, the GDP in Huaishang has increased from RMB 800 million 
(US$123 million) to RMB 8 billion (US$1.23 billion) and the annual growth rate is 
28 with the total fiscal revenue has improved to RMB 901 million (US$138 million) 
(Huaishang District Statistical Bureau, 2015). In addition, at the end of 2013, the pro-
portion of industrial and tertiary sectors stood for almost 87% of the GDP, indicating 
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the traditional agricultural industry only accounted for 13%. Moreover, there were 
73,000 people working in agricultural production, falling to approximately one-fourth 
of local population.  
 
Figure 12. Key economic factors in Huaishang District, 2004-2014 
Source: Huaishang District Statistic Bureau, 2014 
 
 
Although the urbanisation rate has increased from 11.2% to 21.7% from 2004 to 
2014, there exists a significant mismatch between the population percentage working 
in non-agricultural production and the population percentage having urban household 
registration (hukou). Figure 13 reveals that although the population with urban hukou 
has gradually lifted, there is still a majority of local population holding rural hukou 
after eight years since the new district was established. This statistic number indicates 
that the administrative restructuring process has not brought most of the local people 
an authorized access to urban service no matter they came from urban or rural area 
before 2004.  
















Figure 13. Population information in Huaishang District, 2004-2012 
Source: Huaishang District Statistic Bureau (2014) 
 
In terms of an inclusive and productive labour market, the factories and firms located 
in and removed to Huaishang District have indeed provided a large number of job op-
portunities. Interviewees mentioned that local stakeholders especially the middle-
aged group and the young generation can earn higher income from industries than 
agricultural sector, and they recognize the contribution of government in promoting 
local economic growth. The owner of a company, which was established in the same 
year as this district, pointed out that more than 90% of the labour force in her compa-
ny was from local and a standard social insurance was provided to those people by 
the company owner in accordance to the national regulation; nonetheless, as a witness 
of this district, she also showed the concerns about the inefficient land use in industri-
al development (220620151). 
5.3.3 The development of large scale infrastructure projects 
The Pudong New District on the east bank of the Huangpu river in Shanghai delivers 
a positive example that disadvantaged geographic locations do not necessarily mean 
fewer development opportunities (Zhang, 2005). After the municipal government put 
Pudong as the first priority in Shanghai’s development, four bridges and two tunnels 
were built cross the Huangpu river, connecting the downtown of Shanghai and the 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total population 16.26 16.57 16.7 16.89 17 17.14 17.77 17.57 18.09 25.61 
Population with urban hukou 1.4 1.98 2.32 3.21 3.5 3.8 4.03 4.53 5.1 5.63 
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new international financial center Pudong. Similarly, the Huai river was seen as a 
transportation threshold that made north bank 50 years behind south bank (a general 
perception among local governors and residents). Once the municipal government 
decided to develop the north area as an independent administrative district, bridges 
became a crucial part in linking the new district and the other three located in the 
south bank of river. Currently, the fourth bridge is under construction, and the first 
tunnel will be built soon according to the government plan. Looking back to 1980s 
and 1990s, there was only one bridge between south and north bank of the river and 
before this bridge, the only way to cross the river was by ferryboat. According to the 
Bengbu Municipal Planning Bureau (2015), there is a huge job-housing imbalance 
between Huaishang District and other districts on the south bank of Huai river. Ac-
cording to our investigation, the major reason behind the fact that a large number of 
workers in Huaishang District prefer to live in other districts in the urban core is the 
insufficient of public service provision such as schools and hospitals, as well as a lack 
of beautiful landscape. Since the nature of this new district was largely rural area be-
fore 2004, other infrastructures such as roads, water supply, and sewage system are 
equally important in Huaishang’s construction. 
The expansion of services into annexed areas is given substantial consideration in 
some regions of Western countries. For example, in the state of North Carolina, the 
municipality, which seeks to annex surrounding area, must prepare a report including 
a statement clarifying the plans for extending major public services to the annexed 
area and a reasonable timetable for extending water mains and sewer lines within two 
years (Ubell, 2004). Meanwhile, in China, the effective date of developing infrastruc-
ture in the impacted area and how to finance these projects are quite flexible and 
largely dependent on the agenda set the by local government itself. China’s local gov-
ernments are responsible for funding social services, public works, and infrastructure 
development, but they have limited access to tax revenues (Walder, 1992). Therefore, 
land becomes an important asset to gain local revenues in this process. Although the 
1994 Budget Law claims that subnational governments are prohibited from directly 
borrowing, “it has been an open secret that all local governments undertook indirect 
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borrowing through a variety of specially established companies or other entities for 
off-budget borrowing” (Grewal, Cheng, & Rasmussen, 2015, p. 359).  
Although the rural industrialisation was well developed in the former Suburban Dis-
trict, the new Huaishang District was left with large-scale agricultural land in the be-
ginning. To compensate the low local fiscal revenue and feed the district in a normal 
routine, the municipal government decided to transfer the tax revenue from top ten 
companies at the municipal level to Huaishang District (interview 060220152). Addi-
tionally, in the initial phase, Bengbu municipal government allocated RMB 5 million 
(US$768,000) without enumerating the detailed use of this budget (interview 
060220151). However, this amount of money was far from sufficient for an area de-
veloping into an independent and functional urban district, not even enough to build a 
new government building. The solution of this district government was to register a 
state-owned investment and development company in order to raise capital with the 
limited funding (10022015). Not surprisingly, the corresponding person of this com-
pany, named River North New District Development Co. Ltd, is the district chief. In 
2010, an RMB 900 million (US$138 million) loan were provided by Anhui Commer-
cial Bank (huishang yinhang) and China Development Bank (guojia fazhan yinhang) 
through this state-owned company, and this amount of money was reportedly used for 
land loss farmers’ resettlement. As a district developed from an agricultural area, the 
infrastructure construction in Huaishang needed a significant amount of investment, 
and the aforementioned open secret became an important fundraising strategy. By the 
end 2013, it was estimated that the total investment in Huaishang’s infrastructure was 
approximately RMB 7 billion (US$1075 million). Although no official data has been 
released on land leasing fee in Huaishang District since its establishment, there are a 
few clues we can grasp from the published information (Jin, 2014). In 2014, 
Huaishang District leased 24 land plots in total 0.5 km², among which 22 have been 
used as industrial use land (Bengbu Municipal Bureau of National Land and Re-
sources, 2014). In return, the district government received 19 million RMB 
(US$2917,000) as land leasing fee. This land leasing income of Huaishang District in 
2004 is almost the same in 2015 (Huaishang District Finance Bureau, 2015).  
   
 
68 
BT and BOT, referring to Build-Transfer and Built-Operate-Transfer, are two new 
project financing modes appearing in China since the early 2000s. Their popularity in 
China is because through a BT or BOT contract, a private company is allowed to re-
ceive a concession from the public sector to finance, design, construct (and operate) a 
public project, and this company can gradually obtain its costs and revenues through 
payment of instalments and a fee charged to the utility. The difference between BT 
and BOT is that the latter one allows the company to be paid through operation rather 
than by the government as a lender. Regardless of BT or BOT, both of them are seen 
as a typical public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement, which are defined as part-
nerships “between the public sector and the private sector for the purposes of design-
ing, planning, financing, constructing and/or operating projects which would be re-
garded traditionally as part of the public sector” (Webb and Pulle, 2002, p. 1). The 
term was first applied to the provision of public service such as schools and hospitals 
in the Western countries (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2010). In China, PPP was first 
applied in industrial development, followed by infrastructure construction during rap-
id urbanisation process (Wang, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014). 
In the planned economy, the principle was to do what we can do with what we get. 
Under the market economy, we local government have to come up with new ideas 
about financing public projects such as infrastructure construction. So far, BT has 
been adopted to finance the government building and roads, and BOT has been used 
to fund water supply and sewers. (Head of publicity department in Huaishang District, 
2015) 
Moreover, revenue obtained from the recruitment of enterprises and land develop-
ment, as the following discusses, can be used to develop urban infrastructure which in 
turn improve its environment and accessibility for attracting investment. Although the 
district government has made efforts to speed up the development of large-scale in-
frastructure, most of respondents in this study suggested Huaishang District is still in 
an urgent need of better infrastructure construction and more public facilitates. 
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5.3.4 Local government’s strategies for attracting entrepreneurs and land 
developers 
A direct consequence of the decentralisation of economic decision power in China is 
that each local state is interested in attracting business and concentrating investment 
in its own administrative area. To meet needs for economic growth and urban devel-
opment, the recruitment of appropriate enterprises and investment has been one of the 
top priorities since the first-term government in Huaishang. In this regard, local ca-
dres tend to take a proactive role in building this public-private partnerships and to act 
as a service provider in the collaboration process.  
In Huaishang District, the entrepreneurs are the most respected group. I often remind 
our local officials that our salary is from those entrepreneurs’ contribution to tax, 
which accounts for a large percentage of fiscal income. Without the considerable in-
crease in their investment, it is unlikely that we can achieve the economic growth like 
now (First term secretary of Huaishang District, 2015) 
In the early days of rural industrialisation, the cadre network was an important means 
for processing contracts with large firms and how tight local decision-makers were 
connected to this cadre network can, at some extent, influence the success of local 
economic development (Oi, 1999). It seems this cadre network still plays a significant 
role in attracting entrepreneurs. After a certain number of small and medium enter-
prises were attracted to Bengbu Industrial Park and Business Logistics Park in 
Huaishang, the current government started to target the large-scale and well-
established firms. In order to show interests in attracting a leading domestic fashion 
sportswear brand to locate in Huaishang, the district secretary even invited the munic-
ipal secretary to join a business visit in Fujian Province, and finally made a successful 
contract. In addition, the municipal customs once advocated Huaishang District as the 
only option to place a bonded logistic centre in the city because the district secretary 
insisted this centre would be complementary to other on site large-scale firms. In the 
initial phase of district development, there were only 25 projects with more than 
RMB 2 million (US$ 307,100) invested. By the end of 2013, 1,200 projects had been 
built or were under the construction, and 250 projects have been invested more than 
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RMB100 million (US$15.37 million) (Jin, 2015). Notably, Yiwu, the largest small 
commodity market in the world, which origins from Yiwu Village in Zhejiang Prov-
ince, also set up a branch in Huaishang District with more than RMB10 billion 
(US$1537 million). 
As a district that used to have an agricultural-based economy, the large-scale industri-
al development and investment attraction can hardly be irrelevant when it comes to 
land acquisition, housing demolition, and resettlement. According to a village secre-
tary, as a standard compensation, those affected residents received a quota of 45 m² 
per capita in housing resettlement as well as roughly RMB10,000 (US$1535) reloca-
tion allowance per household (Jin, 2015). To a large extent, this compensation mech-
anism based on a ‘demolition after replacement’ strategy can be seen as a pre-
condition for the smooth industrial development. However, many local informants 
suggest that they or their families have encountered some unpleasant experiences and 
the negative comments include compulsory demolition, insufficient financial com-
pensation, unreasonable compensation mechanism, and old-fashioned resettlement 
apartments.  
On the other hand, it is unlikely that the construction of the new Huaishang District 
has provided a better place for urban dwellers to live, which can be indirectly proved 
by the job-housing imbalance between Huaishang District and other districts on the 
south bank of Huai river. According to an online property trading service platform 
(2016), the average housing price in Huaishang is around RMB 4042/m² 
(US$609/m²), which is 17%, 22%, and 50% lower compared to other three urban dis-
tricts respectively. However, what behind the low price is a concern over the high va-
cancy in the housing market. Even though there is no published data about the vacan-
cy rate level, in an online forum, a post about ghost town in Huaishang once triggered 
a hot debate among local stakeholders, and different opinions were put forward about 
the future real estate price (Bengbu Forum, 2013). The direct observation in this area 
also witnessed large dark areas in the commercial real estate property in Huaishang 
District in the evening. According to official data, there are few if any land plots be-
ing leased for residential use in the past three years, indicating the over-supply of real 
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estate properties has already attracted attention from the public sector. This concern 
echoes with a study in which CLSA analyst Nicole Wong and a team of analysts 
spent one year investigating China’s ghost cities (Chen, 2015). They suggest that 
compared to mega cities and large cities, the problem in the real-estate market is the 
serious excess supply in medium- and small-sized cities. The reason is that local gov-
ernments want to gain revenue from vast land but they fail to create enough jobs and 
attract enough residents. Wong’s team further predict that sales in these medium- and 
small-sized cities may shrink by 60% between 2013-2020. Unfortunately, there is no 
official data being released on vacancy rates in Chinese cities, and professionals have 
not reached a consensus on the most suitable approach to calculate this number. Nev-
ertheless, the national statistics bureau reported 8728 billion yuan, or around 1316 
billion US dollars, in domestic property sales through 2015, which accounted for al-
most 13% of China’s GDP (China State Statistical Bureau, 2015). Moreover, till the 
end of 2015, there were 718.5 million square meters properties under sale, which 
were higher than half of the properties sold in the whole year (China State Statistical 
Bureau, 2015). 
 
Chapter 6.  DISCUSSION 
6.1 Administrative restructuring as a strategy of urban governance 
6.1.1 Motivations 
Chinese cities have been making tremendous efforts to address urban problems 
through administrative restructuring, in order to sustain urban growth and improve 
city competitiveness. Behind the popularity of typical approaches such as annexation 
of sub-urban counties and urban districts merge and reorganising in the recent decade, 
there lies a variety of reasons including pressures from limited urban area, local 
state’s ambition, and more spaces needed for economic and population growth. This 
case study of the changes at Bengbu City shows that to break the development re-
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striction produced by the traditional circle-shape Suburban District is the most im-
portant reason for local cadres’ consideration. In other words, to release more land for 
urban development has been the major motivation behind the two adjustments in 
Bengbu’s administrative territory. 
It has been commonly assumed that cities are growth engine and innovation hub in 
China (The Economist, 2015). In this regard, Richard Florida and his colleagues at-
tempt to examine the degree to which China’s massive economic growth, rapid ur-
banisation, and expansion of its cities have come to reflect the underlying human cap-
ital, technology, and creativity (Florida, Mellander & Qian, 2012). After some sophis-
ticated modelling and multivariate analyses, intriguingly, Florida et al claim that none 
of the above factors is associated with China’s dramatic economic growth, casting 
doubt over the sustainability of China’s phenomenal economic transition and urban 
development. Following up with Florida et al’s research, Lin (2014, p. 1815) argues 
that what is missing in their study is “the functioning of land and capital as two basic 
factors of production in China’s urbanisation”. In a similar way, Bai, Chen, and Shi 
(2012) also argue the rampant land development in China acts as both drivers and re-
sults of such an unprecedented economic growth, warning that under the current eco-
nomic growth model, it is difficult that urban expansion control can be achieved 
without sacrificing economic growth and stopping the loss of agricultural land. How-
ever, blaming one of the key production factors is unfair to land. The fundamental 
issue should be how to use and manage the land resource. In the case of Bengbu, 
land, together with the beneficial transportation system, once provided a comparative 
advantage for local development because it made the city as one of the national grain 
depots and an interchange for food industry. In particular, for a long time, the Subur-
ban District, based on which the new Huaishang District was built up, had been con-
sidered as the pillar of primary industry in Bengbu and the important agricultural area 
in Anhui Province. Under the circumstance that China is facing serious pressures 
from food security issue and land degradation, the redevelopment mode of Huaishang 
by the means of transferring an important agricultural area to an industrial region with 
relocation of heavily-polluted chemical factories in the administrative restructuring 
process is subjected to criticism. 
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Over the past three decades, land development has undoubtedly become a main re-
source of revenue generation and capital accumulation for local governments. Ac-
cording to a report published by World Bank and State Council in 2014, the urbanisa-
tion of land in China has happened faster than demographic urbanisation. Today, 
more than 770 million people live in the urban areas, almost four times compared to 
the nearly 200 million in 1980 (NSBC, 2016). Taking China’s more than 260 million 
migrant workers into account, it cannot be denied that administrative restructuring 
also accounts for the increased urban population although to what extent remains un-
clear. This means that a large number of urban inhabitants live in a city not because 
these people decided to move to city but because the city moved to them. 
China’s development priority has been shifted from emphasising political goals to-
ward promoting economic liberalisation (Fan & Scott, 2003). Therefore, the previous 
invisible wall separating a large rural area from a small urban centre has to be demol-
ished, and administrative restructuring becomes a strong government intervention, 
aiming to enhance urban-rural integration and reconfigure the central city and sur-
rounding counties territorial relationship in a metropolitan region. The approaches 
and significances have ranged widely, with city-administering counties in large cities 
during the 1950s, abolishing counties and establishing cities started from the YRD 
and the PRD during 1980s and 1990s, and prevalent urban annexation of surrounding 
counties and districts restructuring in the recent two decades.  
Although critics question that little attention has been paid to other agents of devel-
opment with possibly an overriding importance of state plans and interventions (Fan, 
1997), the evidence of Bengbu shows that the important signals sent from central 
government through China’s administrative system are still of significant importance. 
Moreover, in the process of China’s rapid development, the complexity deeply lies in 
changes in governance at difference levels of government and their interactions. In 
this case, the regional governance, which is “how local governments compete and co-
operate with each other in the region” (Zhang & Wu, 2006, p.4), as well as provincial 
government also determinedly influence the administrative restructuring process in 
Bengbu. The determination to be the most developed city in northern Anhui Province 
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drives the local officials to redraw the urban boundary again and again in order to de-
velop land-based and growth-oriented industrial development. Anyone interpreting 
the message from higher-level governments to local practice should be aware of dif-
ferent local conditions and new market force. In another study (Lin, Yin & Ma, 2011), 
the impact of the central state on a second-tier inland city is considered much less 
than that of the local city government. Nonetheless, it is risky to separate the impact 
into central and local perspectives because the directions of state guidelines have a 
powerful role in developing local policies, especially for those regions with a low 
level of development and a low degree of autonomy. In general, the paradox between 
state and market still points to current dilemmas between the state and its objects of 
governance (Cartier, 2005). Moreover, this case study shows that the discussion of 
central-local relation can by no means only indicate the shuffling power between two 
administrative level governments. The multi-layer administrative system in China de-
cides that facing tightened local budget constraints and a top-down political arrange-
ment, the lower level government such as district government tends to engage in the 
local economic development as a major and dominant participant. 
6.1.2 Processes 
Aiming to promote the urban-rural integration, facilitate the city–wide planning and 
remove the barriers for the expansion of urban built-up area, Bengbu has gone 
through notable administrative restructuring including urban districts reorganisation 
and annexing part of suburban counties. In particular, a new administrative district 
has been established in the north of the city by replacing the old Suburban District 
and annexing huge area from surrounding counties. What the new Huaishang District 
in Bengbu has experienced in the past decade is partially consistent with Shieh’s 
(2011) argument: from the macro perspective, urbanisation is the direct result of ru-
ral-urban integration because rural populations are entitled with urban residents now; 
while from the micro perspective, this integration can be seen in the fact that villages 
are recipients for the granted piecemeal urban status and rural land is subject to the 
process of transition. 
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To functionally integrate the new district into the city, the process of administrative 
restructuring can be manifested in all social, political, and economic dimensions. In 
the social term, the new district government has taken a proactive and strong role in 
providing public service such as infrastructure, in which process government-initiated 
companies and public-private partnerships act not only a facilitator but also an ena-
bler. Even though through PPP, the municipal government and the private sector 
share the financial burdens as well as economic benefits, these two are also regarded 
as the major two resources of local government debt which may pose risks and chal-
lenges to local development (Grewal, Cheng, & Rasmussen, 2015). Since some urban 
infrastructure such as bridges and roads take a long time to construct and an even 
longer time to mature, the risk lies in the difficulty of assessing their efficiency (Har-
vey, 2012). 
Through sending political elites, who are determined to market force and economic 
reform, it is hoped that local development in Huaishang District can be redirected and 
promoted to urban-favoured and growth-oriented mode. Huang (2008) argues that the 
leadership transition plays a decisive role in China’s development. In contrast to the 
top Communist leaders in the 1980s who gained prominence first as officials in the 
poor and agricultural-based rural area, the new politicians in the 1990s were promot-
ed from Shanghai where they adopted a heavy urban bias development strategy prior 
to taking the role of state leaders. A series of urban-biased policies enumerated by 
Yang (1999) and Li (2003) vividly illustrate the state’s preference on urban area, in-
cluding governmental regulation on the agricultural products dealing price, favoura-
ble welfare systems to the urban residents, the unreasonable tax burden on rural popu-
lations, and investment credits particularly to urban sector. The significance of lead-
ership transition is also manifested by the case study in this research. The traditional 
relationships between cities and districts have been gradually changed towards a di-
rection that the districts are endowed larger decision-making power than before. Dis-
tricts governments once played a peripheral role in the socialism era with limited re-
sources and administrative power. Since early 1990s, the urban districts started to 
gain control in managing local revenue and land, as well as administrative capacities 
such as planning and public work maintenance. Not only in large metropolitans like 
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Shanghai and Beijing, the evidence of Bengbu also finds a strong role that the district 
government plays in local development. Under a hierarchical political system in 
which local officials are not elected by affected residents but appointed by senior 
government, the top-level cadres in a locality decisively influence the development 
direction of this region. That is to say, to some extent, the later prospects for local de-
velopment are in the hands of a few political elites. The direct result is what Zhang 
(2002, p. 494) argues, “the appointment and promotion system causes all officials to 
‘look up’ to the desires of higher level government rather than ‘looking down’ to 
needs of community residents because residents do not have the election power as 
they do in the US”. 
In economic terms, the location of new development, specialization of land use, as 
well as the size of district can all make an impact on the government revenue, the 
profitability of firms, and the provision of goods and services (Schneider, Chang, & 
Paulsen, 2015). In the case of Huaishang District, market forces play a decisive role 
in formulating the local development agenda, developing pro-growth urban govern-
ance, and adopting new market strategies to solve financial problems. In this process, 
district governors have gradually built business partnerships with private entrepre-
neurs from the industries of real estate, logistics, manufacture, etc. The district gov-
ernment also runs a state-owned company for fundraising, which is not innovative but 
popular in China nowadays. For example, Bengbu City Investment Group is such a 
company owned by Bengbu municipal government. According to the agreement, all 
the financial support to infrastructure construction that the municipality receives is 
allocated to this company. More important, land and infrastructure construction are 
allowed to act as a valuable asset to enhance the fundraising capacity of this compa-
ny. Despite the reality that the GDP of Huaishang has sharply lifted with 28% annual 
growth rate and more job opportunities have been provided in the past decade, it 
should be noted that the lofty rhetoric of rural-urban integration could also be reflect-
ed on relocating large-scale, state-owned chemical enterprises from central urban to 
the new district. In addition, a certain amount of rural area has been endowed with 
urban status, and large-scale rural land including agricultural use and construction use 
have been transferred to urban construction land for developing industrial parks and 
   
 
77 
supporting infrastructure projects. On the other hand, however, the low population 
percentage with urban household registration reflects that the administrative restruc-
turing processes have not brought most of the local people an authorized access to 
urban service. 
6.1.3 Impacts 
Since the mid-1980s, the decentralisation of decision-making power along with the 
diverse resources of investment such as foreign investment, have provided an ena-
bling environment for economic growth. With the new fiscal structure, the strong in-
centives received by local governments to carry out urban-biased policies have been 
challenged because the rapid development of China is questioned at expense of the 
rapid land degradation in quality and quantity, habitat fragmentation, increasing re-
gional disparity, and sustainability challenges (Rozelle, Veeck, & Huang, 1997; Xie, 
Mei, Tian, & Xing, 2005; Yeh & Li, 1999). In the process of implementing adminis-
trative restructuring, land plays a unique and significant role. From both perspectives 
of qualitative and quantitative, it is difficult to assess if the policy makers achieve 
their goals through implementation of administrative restructuring and what the im-
pacts upon local stakeholders are. Even though, it does not prevent Chinese cities 
from adopting this strategy across the country. The case study of Bengbu City is a 
microcosm of China’s hundreds of medium-sized cities that have experienced large-
scale administrative restructuring process. The empirical evidence shows that the pro-
cesses of district restructuring and city-annexing counties in the city of Bengbu have 
gone beyond spatial reorganisation and physical transformation of built environment. 
Instead, it has deeply touched upon the entire change to the local development includ-
ing not only in tangible entity such as land conversion from cultivated to industrial 
use and large-scale construction of infrastructure, but also in less tangible form such 
as formation of a new government, economic reconstruction, and environment con-
tamination. 
In the discussion of local development in Chinese cities, changes in the administrative 
systems can be seen as an important institutional force driving different facets in ur-
   
 
78 
ban fringe transformation. Several studies have argued that by the early 2000s, devel-
opment zones (kaifa qu) have been gradually replaced by new city (xincheng) projects 
at the urban fringe as seen in the cities of Zhengzhou, Tianjing and Hangzhou (Hsing, 
2010; Qian, 2012). A major reason is that massive migrations from rural areas and 
less-developed regions have resulted in a significant increase in the demand for con-
struction land for residential use. Therefore, in contrast with development zones 
which are more industrial-oriented, new city project tends to provide a mix-use of 
land resources such as commercial, residential, cultural, and administrative purposes 
(Hsing, 2010). However, it should be noted that for the small and medium-sized cities 
such as Bengbu, the establishment of industrial parks (gongye yuan) and development 
zones (kaifa qu) still dominate the main stream of urban fringe development for the 
city’s economic growth. A consensus has been gradually reached among local offi-
cials that development zones should be enclaves for industries previously locating in 
the urban core, and new cities should accommodate increasing populations previously 
living in the city centre (Gu, 2002; Zhou and Ma, 2000). Since there have been lim-
ited migrant workers floating to small- and medium-sized cities compared with large 
and mega cities, the evidence in Bengbu is in accordance with national trend. Moreo-
ver, considering the most of urban fringe area is developed from counties, it should be 
recognized that it is administrative restructuring that made the establishment of indus-
trial parks and new city project develop smoothly.  
6.2 The formation of a pro-growth coalition 
The pro-growth coalition initially stems from Western theories, suggesting that the 
governing coalition of a city can be built by local government and private business 
groups (Molotch 1976; Stone, 1993). In his research investigating if there is a pro-
growth coalition in a socialist society, Zhang (2002) argues that a distinguished phe-
nomenon in China lies in various types and levels of governments in Chinese cities. 
The fact that public sector or marketplace dominantly controls resource allocation 
eventually decides if local government has to work with the private sector in a city’s 
governance. Moreover, in such cities as Beijing and Shanghai where both public and 
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private sectors have been well developed, the power of governance is moving toward 
balance between the two.  
Reviewing Huaishang District’s development, it seems that the two adjustments have 
gradually produced a pro-growth coalition in which the municipal government initiat-
ed, the district government led, and the private sector joined. Behind the decisions of 
administrative restructuring, there are multiple purposes and motivations. To city 
leaders, the motivation was to correspond to the higher administrative level leaders, to 
release more land for urban development at the municipal level, as well as to relocate 
heavy polluted industries from urban core to newly established district. In China, mu-
nicipal governors with remarkable performance are likely to gain a higher status in 
the political system. Two Bengbu government leaders serving in 2004 and 2012, Fang 
Ping and Chen Qi-tao (both were party secretaries), have been promoted to positions 
at the provincial level. To municipal government, agricultural production and food 
security become gradually less a responsibility compared to economic growth in the 
market economy (Zhang, 2000). Therefore, to break the development constraint pro-
duced by limited land, urban boundary expansion by annexing neighboring counties 
was adopted twice in 2004 and 2014. Meanwhile, the traditional Suburban District 
was significantly detached into four parts, and a new urban district was established. 
According to the National New Urbanisation Plan (2014-2020) unveiled by the State 
Council in March 2014, new urban districts should be established on scientific stand-
ards with considerations on the scale and structure of other districts within the same 
municipality. However, the official document – China Urban Districts Establishment 
Standards, issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in October 2014, only take popula-
tion, economic development, and geographical size as three important references (Xu, 
2015).  
Like many other Chinese cities, the development path of Bengbu City is shaped by 
the local government rather than a central authority – determined industrial pattern. 
First-hand data used in this study was mainly collected at the municipal and district 
level. Eight government officials and planners provided insights on the motivations 
and means of administrative restructuring in Bengbu City and Huaishang District in 
particular. At the district level, the motivations of administrative restructuring process 
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penetrated into the establishment/redevelopment of a new district. To district cadres, 
the motivation was to promote industrial transformation, to enhance local economic 
growth, and to brand the new district. Although Bengbu City government has played 
a leading role in reconfiguring the city’s spatial patterns, district cadres acted as a ma-
jor player in creating local pro-growth coalition. Since land resources in urban and 
suburban places can generate fiscal revenue to fuel local development, a rapid agri-
cultural land to urban construction land transformation occurred along with adminis-
trative restructuring processes. Compared to other urban districts located in the city 
core, the new Huaishang District dominated the majority of land supply, and as a re-
sult, produced significantly increased fiscal income.  
When the state attempted to shift the main growth engine of this new district to sec-
ondary industry and real estate development, non-state sectors responded accordingly 
and proactively. Build-Transfer (BT) and Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), the two 
new project-financing modes, were adopted as important approaches to relieve Chi-
nese government’s budgetary pressure and finance infrastructure construction and 
development during China’s rapid urbanisation process. Bengbu is no exception. In 
Huaishang District, government buildings, roads, water supply, and sewerage system 
were all financially supported by PPP. The significance of PPP lies in that this joint 
investments and long-term relationships are expected to benefit both public and pri-
vate sectors because either of them could hardly achieve all the objectives (Brewer & 
Hayllar, 2005). For private sectors, the main motivation is to maximize their econom-
ic profits and investment returns on a long-term basis. Since PPP encourage the coop-
eration among different parities, private sector participants may seek for more busi-
ness opportunities in the implementation process. However, due to unclear risk allo-
cation, weak supervision, and the lack of a legal framework for implementation, the 
results of PPP vary from case to case (Ke, 2014; Y. Zhao, 2015). Moreover, it is very 
likely to overlook the general public because local governors tend to make decisions 
based on their own judgments and preferences (Ke, Wang, & Chan, 2012). 
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6.3 The relationship between administrative restructuring and urban 
planning 
To achieve better control, China has implemented various categories of urban plan-
ning, from regional level (city region plan and urban system plan), city level (master 
plan), and district level (city district plan), to local level (detailed development con-
trol and detailed construction plan) and site-specific occasions (Central People’s 
Government, 2007). There is a tight relationship between urban planning and admin-
istrative restructuring because the formation and authorization of plans track a top-
down approach which complies with the hierarchical administrative system. In recent 
years, as a result of local municipalities being approved a greater capacity to promote 
local economic development, new types of planning are emerging such as concept 
plan and strategic plan, focusing on urban development, land use, and local competi-
tiveness (Yeh, Xu, & Liu, 2012; P. Zhao, 2015). The popularity of strategic planning 
since the late 1990s has been tightly linked to administrative restructuring, which is 
seen as an important instrument to react to the upcoming opportunities. Based on a 
case study of Ordos, Wang and Liu (2016) advise urban planning, by issuing spatial 
arrangement and industrial policies, significantly promotes administrative restructur-
ing in Chinese inland cities. Zhang and Wu (2006) also argue that many city govern-
ments adopt strategic plans in order to reduce the hurdles for the adjustment of ad-
ministrative territory. Conversely, it is believed that administrative restructuring 
would also facilitate urban planning process and rural-urban integration (Ma, 2005).  
The evidence presented in the empirical finding of Bengbu City supports the idea that 
administrative restructuring and urban planning are mutually influenced and justified 
by each other (table 8). Urban planning has been intertwined with property–led 
(re)development in which process new urban spaces such as industrial parks and real 
estates development for commercial and residential use have been created (Liu, Yin, 
& Ma, 2012). Although there is no quantitative information that can be accessed in 
Huaishang district, the direct observations and interviews show that the implementa-
tion of the property-led development heavily relies on administrative restructuring 
handed down by local government. Clearly, ambitious urban planning signals future 
administrative adjustment; existing administrative adjustment, in turn, boosts and 
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fuels future urban planning. Together, they conjure up highly visible accomplishment 




In January 2004, the State Council approved the first administrative adjustment of Beng-
bu City –districts restructuring and annexation of part of suburban counties. In particular, 
a new district named Huaishang was established in the north of city. 
Between March 2013 and April 2014, Anhui provincial government agreed to place two 
towns under administration of urban districts in Bengbu City. In particular, Mohekou 
Town was annexed by Huaishang District. 
Planning In Bengbu City Master Plan (2008-2020) which was initiated in 2003, an ‘exit from urban 
and enter park (tui shi jin yuan)’ plan on chemical enterprises’ relocation was clearly put 
forward. Mohekou industrial park was arranged as the potential relocation site for several 
state-owned chemical enterprises sited in city center. 
In 2003, Anhui provincial government suggested that Bengbu should be developed as the 
central city in Northern Anhui. Later on, Huaishang District was positioned as a sub-
centre in the city of Bengbu by the municipal government, supporting agricultural pro-
duction, industrial development, and residential living.  
In March 2014, Mohekou Town in Huaishang District suggested a ‘four-in-one (si wei yi 
ti)’ strategic planning, aiming to develop the chemical industry in the east, to reserve land 
for residential and public use in the west, to promote commercial district in the south, and 




Since 2004, several large-scale and heavily polluted state-owned chemical enterprises 
have been relocated to Huaishang District, including COFCO and BBCA industrial sites. 
Two bridges have been built in the past decade and the fourth bridge will be completed in 
the end of 2016. Moreover, the first tunnel will be built soon according to the government 
plan. 
In the year of 2013, Huaishang District attracted investment RMB 7 billion 
(US$ 1.05billion) including RMB 710.4million (US$106.73 million) foreign direct in-
vestment. 
Table 8. Stages and key events of Huaishang District construction 
Source: complied based on official documents and interviews 
 
Chapter 7.  CONCLUSION 
Research on urban development in China is today increasingly complicated, which is 
not simply because “the urban has been superseded as a level of analysis and social 
struggle” (Brenner, 2000), but also because this phenomenal process combines both 
strong Chinese characteristics and those strategies developed by their Western coun-
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terparts. Taking Bengbu City as an example, this research attempts to develop a com-
prehensive analytical framework, which includes the institutional arrangement, pro-
growth urban governance theories, as well as the scale perspective, to facilitate the 
understanding of China’s administrative restructuring.  
As an important part of formal institutional arrangement in China, the administrative 
system has experienced significant changes during the past two decades. The modifi-
cations do not lie in the hierarchical skeleton of the system itself but are centered on 
how the central state continues to reset the definition and standard of different admin-
istrative level as the rules of the game, and how the local governments utilize admin-
istrative restructuring as an urban governance strategy to fulfil their political and eco-
nomic purposes as the plays of the game. In particular, the underlying drivers of these 
changes lie in the interaction among different levels of governments and the interplay 
between the plan and the market economy. Although the State Council has started 
allowing public participation at lower levels of policymaking, and bottom-up forces 
have developed such as the growth of civil society and the appearance of the middle 
class (P. Zhao, 2015), public hearings on administrative issues and their real impacts 
on policymaking are still indecipherable. This study has shown that the institutional 
rearrangement, represented by the administrative restructuring in Bengbu City, served 
as a technical tool for shifting the development of suburban area from agriculture-
dominated industrial structure into one led by the secondary and tertiary industries. 
The employment structure also changed accordingly. However, the whole process 
barely permitted the public to get involve in.  
Urban governance in general is thought to be full of power relations, diverse interests, 
and underlying conflicts. Based on a combination of data sources, including docu-
mentation, archival records, interviews, and direct observations, it is found that the 
two adjustments processed in Bengbu have provided a series of interrelated chances 
for local governments to reach their economic and political goals set by themselves. 
Reviewing Huaishang District’s establishment and development, administrative re-
structuring through reorganising urban districts and annexing part of surrounding 
counties have gradually produced a pro-growth coalition in which the municipal gov-
ernment initiated, the district government led, and the private sector joined. Com-
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pared to Western theories such as growth machine and urban regime where the cen-
tral government barely engages in local issues, in-depth interviews with important 
local officials in this study show that the role of central state remains crucial in 
providing directives for local economic and urban development. However, under the 
fiscal pressure and driven by profit motive, municipal and district governments have 
eventually shifted its primary role from a public goods provider to a major pro-
growth coalition builder and player. In particular, under the pressure of fund cutting 
from Bengbu municipal government, Huaishang District has actively sought for and 
heavily relied on building public-private partnerships in order to solve budget con-
straints. This brings about another distinguish feature of state in China which is the 
multi-layer governments at the local level. As argued by Zhang (2002), the central 
government may still possess the direct power over the sub-national governments on 
political issues, but it can no longer maintain the power over different stakeholders on 
local economic affairs. On the other hand, this reconfigured relationship has empow-
ered the local governments to ensure its discretion over resources for urban growth 
and control over local urban transformation.  
From the scale perspective, the evidence of Bengbu City echoes with Ma’s (2005) 
argument that a downward shift in the scale of operation focused on Chinese cities 
has eventually replaced the national scale. Except for county-level cities, cities at or 
above prefecture-level as a particular type of scale have direct power to establish and 
rearrange urban districts with authorization from the central state or the provincial 
government. As a prefecture-level city, Bengbu municipal government has exercised 
their power over those districts and counties under its control. Without counties being 
vertically upgraded to a higher administrative status, Bengbu City has adopted a scal-
ing up strategy which was a substantial and extensive horizontal territorialisation pro-
cess characterized by the districts restructuring and the expansion in urban area. 
However, in both cases of administrative system and urban-rural divide, the complex-
ity presented in the newly established Huaishang District is that the scaling up pro-
cess has imposed revolutionary impacts on affected residents, land use, economic 
conditions, governments and party appointments. It has been manifested in following 
ways: annexing part of surrounding counties retitled a large number of populations 
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from rural to urban habitants; land was being rapidly converted form rural uses and 
urban uses; local development was shifted from an agricultural-based economy to a 
profit-driven economy composing of both secondary and tertiary industries; district 
governments were authorized with more decision making power; party-appointment 
was rearranged to an urban-oriented leadership strategy. Application of the scale per-
spective facilitates to answer why the city level and the urban part continues to be 
important scales for studying the interaction of demographic, economic, social, and 
political changes in the process of administrative restructuring.  
Listed as an important industrial city by the central state and allocated many heavy 
industry projects in the late 1970s, Bengbu is nowadays seen as a less-developed city 
at provincial and national level due to the lack of capacity and flexibility in response 
to marketization and decentralization. The evidence from this study suggests that the 
primary motivation behind the government-led administrative restructuring processes 
lies in an urgent need to promote economic growth in the edge area between urban 
and rural, as well as to remove the barriers for urban development as a whole. During 
this process, the urban-rural integration, or the so-called functional integration of the 
peripheral area into urban core can be manifested in a series of ways such as appoint-
ing urban officials in the previous rural area, introducing market mechanism to tackle 
economic problems, and encouraging local dwellers to work from primary industry to 
the secondary and tertiary industry. Statistically, the economic growth of Huaishang 
District is astonishing. In addition to a significant increase in fiscal income and in-
vestment attraction, the annual growth rate of GDP from 2004 to 2014 is 28%, which 
is much higher than municipal and national data. However, it is important to bear in 
mind that the different natures of the three industrial sectors also account for the surge 
in GDP growth. On the other hand, it should be noted that the lofty rhetoric of urban-
rural integration is also reflected in relocating large-scale state-owned chemical en-
terprises from central urban to the new district and degrading cultivated land for inef-
ficient urban construction use.  
The relationship between urban planning and administrative restructuring in China is 
not generally recognized in the literature. The evidence of Bengbu indicates that the 
work of urban planning and progress of administrative restructuring have been mutu-
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ally responsive, characterized by the fact that specific development projects which 
were signaled by the planning documents have been eventually achieved in the pro-
cess of administrative restructuring, and in turn, it reinforced the next round of plan-
ning. As such developments are rarely coordinated, they have degraded land use effi-
ciency, forced the relocation of affected residents, and triggered conflicts over social 
and environmental issues. The needs of the local habitants were largely ignored and 
bottom-up voice could be hardly heard in the decision making process. The story of 
the newly established urban district in Bengbu also resonates with what characterizes 
most of the urban peripheries in contemporary Chinese cities – a juxtaposition of ag-
ricultural, industrial, and residential activities. In the coastal areas with more devel-
opment opportunities, massive rural-urban migration and rapid commercial and in-
dustrial development have put more pressures on the demand for urban construction 
land in the city periphery. Notably, although many cities in China have not made such 
spectacular achievements in economic growth and industrialization as their costal 
counterparts, the same rampant urban expansion has also occurred, in which process 
territorial expansion becomes a major facilitator and enabler.  
In the post-reform era, various types of administrative restructuring have been pro-
gressively introduced in China such as city administering counties, county to city up-
grading, annexation of suburban counties, and urban districts reconfiguration. During 
the past two decades, the last three categories (county to city upgrading, annexation 
of suburban counties, urban districts reconfiguration) have been widely adopted. This 
spectacular restructuring process has ignited the debate of social scientist, and re-
searchers like Ma (2002, 2004, 2005), Chien (2010, 2013), and Cartier (2005, 2015, 
2016) have drawn heavily from the experiences of mostly large cities in economically 
advanced regions. Compared to major cities in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl 
River Delta where the ratio of new urban area to original urban area could be as high 
as at least five times such as Changzhou, Hangzhou, and Foshan, the ratio in Bengbu 
city is two times which is less astonishing. In spite of that, important implications for 
the field of knowledge are put forward. First, regardless of the development catego-
ries of cities and which specific strategies are implemented, the process of administra-
tive restructuring shows that marketization in China has granted local government 
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with more decision-making power and reduced state control of local economy and 
society. In this process, various administrative changes articulate the reliance on mar-
ket mechanisms in place marketing, land-use planning, and image building. The sig-
nificance in the coastal-interior divide lies in the fact that the urban territorial expan-
sion in coastal cities is more likely associated with globalization impacts such as for-
eign direct investment while interior cities like Bengbu is more restricted and influ-
enced by internal forces. Second, although the power of the state in China has never 
faded, power dynamics between central and local governments vary from region to 
region. Compared with those economically developed regions where administrative 
restructuring has been seen as a direct response to central government project, the im-
pact of the central state on Bengbu is more ideological through providing broad 
guidelines than tangible by the means of direct intervention. The similarity can be 
found in the fact that urban district, as an administrative unit and a scale level, has 
played an increasingly important role in most Chinese cities during administrative 
restructuring process. Although party appointment and cadre promotion at the district 
level remain under the control of municipal government as a result of solidifying po-
litical legitimacy, district governments have been given considerable latitude in man-
aging local resources and shaping local development. On the other hand, the empiri-
cal finding of Bengbu is different from economically advanced region with regards to 
the disagreements among local governments. The evidence of Bengbu tends to be 
more agreeable whilst the other group experiences more intense conflicts and compe-
titions, which could be partly explained by the different extents to which administra-
tive system lags behind economic reform in different regions. 
What the future holds for Huaishang District and Bengbu City will be determined 
jointly by what type of policy orientation will dominate in the future –if economic 
growth will still be the priority, by what the local government will do to deal with the 
critical problems in the urban development –if the interests of plural groups can be 
fairly considered, and by which process of policy design and implementation will 
eventually evolve into –if bottom-up voice can be heard in the decision making pro-
cess. Considering the extensive industrial development in a newly established district 
is at the cost of destroying the place-specific locational advantage, an important im-
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plication of this study is that for other regions which may have the similar develop-
ment constraints that Bengbu City faced more than ten years ago, if there is an alter-
native approach to tackle these problems. As reminded by Ma (2002) and Wei (2012), 
industrial growth should not be the only path that Chinese cities have pursued for 
reaching a more vibrant local economy, which makes Chinese cities are broadly simi-
lar to each other. Local endogenous resources, which are the agricultural base and 
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Recent studies on China’s administrative divisions adjustment 
Paper/author(s) Related findings Key arguments 
Administrative changes 
and urban population in 
China (Ma & Cui, 1987) 
1. “China’s economic reforms since 1979 have clearly emphasised the 
role of the cities, which are seen not only as the centres of production but 
also as the hubs of regional economics.”(p.393) 
2. “The aggregate population of the officially designated cities and 
towns, which has been widely used in China and elsewhere as an indica-
tor of China’s urbanisation level, should no longer be used because of 
changes after 1979 in the designation of urban areas.” (p.373) 
1. “The post-1979 urban administrative changes that have resulted in 
the addition of an enormously large proportion of agricultural popula-
tion to the aggregate population of the designated cities and towns. 
The use of this aggregate population as a measure of China’s urbani-
sation tends to exaggerate the real level of urbanisation.” (p.394) 
2. “As such, the nonagricultural population of the designated cities 
and towns is a more appropriate indicator of China’s urbanisation 
level.” (p.394) 
China’s city hierarchy, 
urban policy and spatial 
development in the 
1980s (Chen, 1991) 
1. “Nationally, the city hierarchy has been marked by accelerating urban-
isation: both the proportion of urban population and the number of cities 
more than doubles in the 1980s.”(p.360) 
2. “Faster growth of the medium-sized and small cities helped balance 
the city hierarchy further. In addition, the speedy and extensive devel-
opment of towns was a driving force behind urbanisation.” (360) 
1. “The growth of cities and towns in various size categories reflects 
the influence of urban policy in reshaping China’s urban hierarchy.”  
(p.341) 
2. “There is a growing discrepancy in socioeconomic development 
between inland and coastal cities that is consistent with the recent 
policy of favouring the coastal economy.”  (p.341) 
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The growth and structur-
al change of Chinese 
cities: a contextual and 
geographic analysis 
(Lin, 2002) 
1. “In line with the demise of the Maoist regime in the late 1970s, market 
reforms and relaxation of state control over local development have al-
lowed a large number of small cities and towns to flourish on the basis 
on bottom-up rural transformative development.” (p.313) 
2. “Although small cities have played a growing role in the absorption of 
population and land development, large cities have remained the most 
efficient and productive economic centres for capital investment and 
production.” (p.313) 
1. “China’s urban development since the economic reform has been 
the direct outcome of national political strategizing, state articulation 
ad reconfiguration, and shifts in global capital accumulation.” (p.299) 
2. “Large and extra-large cities remain the centres of capital invest-
ment and production, although small cities have taken up a growing 
share of the urban population. This pattern is distinct from the norm 
in many market economies of the West, where the concentration of 
economic activities and population often go together.” (p.314) 
Urban transformation in 
China, 1949-2000: a 
review and research 
agenda (Ma, 2002) 
 
1. “Among the many facets of urban transformation since 1978 are a 
more heterogeneous urban population, rural-urban migration, spatial 
reorganization through urban land-use change, new housing develop-
ment, globalization, suburbanisation, polycentric restructuring of urban 
form, and changes in the spatial/administrative systems of cities.” 
(p.545) 
2. “The central role that the Party-state has played in affecting the pro-
cess and outcomes of urbanisation and urbanism. Despite globalisation 
of production and the intrusion of market forces, the basic system of po-
litical control in China remains intact.” (p.563) 
1. “The continuously powerful and multiple roles of the Party-state as 
the ultimate decision maker, regulator, and participant in the urban 
economy should be emphasized, despite globalization and decentrali-
zation of administrative and fiscal powers from the central to local 
levels.” (p.545) 
2. “More general theories of urban transformation which are applica-
ble to a number of former socialist nations, and which transcend the 
idiosyncrasies of individual countries, should be developed where 
possible.” (p.545) 




ban spatial restructuring, 
and planning in China 
(Ma, 2004)  
 
1. “The power of the state in China has never declined; it has simply 
been rescaled in favour of the local units. This rescaling of power has 
significantly enhanced the capability of the local state to shape local 
events.” (p.238) 
2. “China’s urban spatial transformation in the last two decades has been 
centred on and fuelled by the development of urban real estate whose 
development can generate significant amount of immediate and long-
term incomes for selected interest groups.” (p.257) 
1. “In general, China’s urban planning work far has been essentially 
reactive, characterised by planners responding to the exigencies of 
specific development projects dictated by the financially and political 
powerful interest groups.” (p.257) 
2. “As such developments are rarely coordinated, they have contribut-
ed to serious urban sprawl, haphazard land use patterns and forced the 
displacement and relocation of hundreds of thousands of unhappy 
residents per year.” (p.257) 
City-space: scale rela-




1. “The categories and rank orders are a dynamic territorial system, peri-
odically altered by the state to meet diverse political and economic goals, 
which means that the Chinese space economy is an actively scaled terri-
torial mosaic whose dialectical interrelations the state seeks to manage in 
order to spur economic development while simultaneously maintaining 
political control.” (p.25) 
2. “Scale relations, as a theoretical project and methodology, focus on 
interrelations between multiple-scale positions and resources that circu-
late through them, and thus spatialize the state-territorial dynamic, ulti-
mately revealing the complex spatial processes propelling transformative 
change in contemporary China.” (p.21) 
1. “In the context of globalization and scale relations, the city, espe-
cially at the scale of the metropolitan region, is the spatial territory 
and unit of economic analysis most suited to the interaction of politi-
cal, social and economic processes in an era of globalization. Thus, 
scale is a conceptual means of geographical differentiation, a system 
of state administration represented by the administrative hierarchy, 
and a set of processes by which the local state, in its urban and re-
gional capacities, organizes political power, society, and economy.” 
(p.30) 
 
Local state and adminis-
trative urbanisation in 
1. “The paper sheds light on the processes of urban transformation in 
Hebi, a medium-sized inland city in Henan province, emphasizing the 
1. “In the model of administrative urbanisation, the local state uses 
the enormous administrative and fiscal powers granted by the central 
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post-reform China: A 
case study of Hebi City, 
Henan Province (Liu, 
Yin, &Ma, 2012) 
 
critical role that the local state has played in city-making, the mecha-
nisms and processes of change, and the resultant impacts on the city.” 
(p.107) 
2. “The implementation of these policies and measures relied heavily on 
administrative orders handed down through the highly heavily on admin-
istrative/spatial hierarchy of the local party-state. From this perspective, 
the Chinese model of urbanisation described in this study can be charac-
terized as “administrative urbanisation” that has given rise to new urban 
economic and social structures and new spatial orders in different Chi-
nese cities.” (p.116) 
state to reach to desired goals it sets for itself. The goals almost invar-
iably reflect the central state’s guidelines for national economic and 
social development. Through a series of local policies and institution-
al arrangement, the local state strives to attain the goals of local eco-
nomic and urban development.” (p.116) 
Post-reform urban re-
structuring in China: the 
case of Hangzhou 1990-
2010 (Qian, 2012) 
1. “Urban restructuring in Hangzhou has not only been a spatial process 
but an opportunity to strengthen the capacity of local urban governance. 
Rather than declining, state power has been reconfigured to enhance the 
power of local states to shape local urban transformation.” (p. 450) 
2. “Mega-scale urban development initiatives like development zones 
and New City have allowed Hangzhou’s administrative bureaucracy to 
be transformed into localised entrepreneurial governance in service of 
the city’s urban growth ambitions.” (p. 450) 
1. “The vertical power relationship between local governments and 
the central state and the various horizontal relationships between local 
state and non-state actors mean that urban restructuring in Chinese 
cities is by no means driven purely by the market force, but rather, by 
the deeply entangled forces from both the state and the market.” (p. 
450) 
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Restructuring for growth 
in urban China: Transi-
tional institutions, urban 
development, and spatial 
transformation (Wei, 
2012)  
1. “Land development has become a central component of urban poli-
cies. Urban planning has become a tool to rationalize urban expansion 
and obtain land development quotas from the central government. 
Rescaling has been used as a tool to increase urban administrative areas 
and provides more land resources for urban development. State institu-
tions not only direct the land development process, but also lead large-
scale land development projects.” (p.404) 
2. “Moreover, as evidenced in Hangzhou, urban policies in Chinese cit-
ies are unstable or transitional, featured by the restless changes of admin-
istrative boundaries, endless revisions of urban master plans, and shifting 
city leaders’ development objectives, which has made urban planning a 
highly challenging task in Chinese cities.” (p.404) 
1. “China’s urban policies are state institution- directed, growth-
oriented, and land-based, imposing unprecedented challenges to sus-
tainability and livability. Land development and spatial restructuring 
are central to urban policies in China. Last, while Hangzhou’s devel-
opment strategies and policies to some extent reflect policy conver-
gence across cities in China, local/spatial contexts, including local 
settings, territorial rescaling and land conditions, are underlying the 
functioning of development/entrepreneurial states.” (p.396) 
New local state power 
through administrative 
restructuring –A case 
study of post-Mao China 
county-level urban en-
trepreneurialism in Kun-
shan (Chien, 2013) 
 
1. “Kunshan’s successful urban entrepreneurialism presents a unique 
‘mismatch’ between ‘low’ administrative rank and ‘great’ economic per-
formance.” (p.103) 
2. “The case of Kunshan shows that Chinese cities are now becoming 
innovative in the administrative system. By doing so, more new state 
powers are better institutionalized and endorsed by upper-level govern-
ments. The central and provincial governments also play a crucial role in 
administrative restructuring to facilitate the transformation of county-
level urban entrepreneurialism.” (p.110) 
1. “Kunshan has developed several new local state powers through 
flexible administrative restructuring that explains the ‘mismatch’ puz-
zle and includes the following characteristics: (1) reclassification of 
Kunshan from county to county-level city, (2) relational adjustment 
by officially or informally raising Kunshan’s place rank and the cadre 
rank, and (3) boundary revision by virtual enclave enlargement.” 
(p.103) 
 




and urban land expan-
sion in transitional China 
(Li, Wei, Liao, and 
Huang, 2015)  
1. “Urban expansion in China is driven by mixed drivers including eco-
nomic transition, local state effort, economic and population growth. 
High-level cities’ urban expansion in China is more likely associated 
with FDI, characterizing the significant impact of economic globalisation 
on urban expansion in these cities.” (p.185) 
2. “As land use decision-making becomes a central issue of china, the 
hierarchy of Chinese cities tends to reinforce the inequalities in land de-
velopment and cause more tensions between different levels of cities.” 
(p.185) 
1. “Urban land expansion coincides with administrative hierarchy, 
and cities with higher administrative levels (ranked by central gov-
ernment) tend to expand more rapidly while controlling for other eco-
nomic and demographic drivers of urban expansion.” (p.177) 
Territorial urbanisation 
and the party-state in 
China (Cartier, 2015) 
 
1. “Pudong and other strategic economic areas are administrative territo-
ries produced by state reterritorialization to engender new political-
economic arrangements, demonstrating general process and specific in-
stances of incremental territorial administrative change.” (p.314) 
2. “The common absence of analysis of the administrative divisions in 
the literature reflects non-transparent conditions of information, and lack 
of comparative theoretical baseline.” (p.315) 
1. “Changing the administrative divisions is a common, periodic con-
dition of the Chinese state system. Because the territorial administra-
tive system is also the geographical basis of citizenship and govern-
ment, the Party appointments, administrative division adjustment co-
involves multiple conditions and variables.” (p.315) 
 




Overview of main interviewees in the fieldwork 
Name of institutions interviewed Key Informant Date 
Bengbu Municipal Government Vice Mayor 25032014 
Publicity Department in Huaishang District Minister 06022015(1) 
CPPCC (the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Confer-
ence) in Huaishang District 
Secretary General 06022015(2) 
Statistic Department in Huaishang District Staff 06022015(3) 
CPPCC (the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Confer-
ence) in Bengbu Municipality  
Chairman (First 
Term Secretary of 
Huaishang District) 
10022015 
Bengbu Green Garden Company +(!	 Vice General Man-
ager 
22062015(1) 
Bengbu Green Garden Company +(!	 Accountant 22062015(2) 





Anhui Xuelang Biological Technologies Inc.1.&$'
) 0	 
Sales Manager 25062015(2) 
Bengbu Municipal Planning Bureau Planner 02092015(1) 
Bengbu Municipal Planning Bureau Planner 02092015(2) 
Lvcheng Chunjiang Mingyue Real Estate Company (in the 
form of questionnaire) (" 
General Manager 19092015 
Mingzhu Guangchang Phoenix Real Estate Company (in the 
form of questionnaire) %
 
General Manager 19092015 
Bengbu Guogou Guangchang Real Estate Company (in the General Manager 19092015 
   
 
119 
form of questionnaire) +, 
Bengbu Guogou Guangchang Real Estate Company (in the 




Zhongheng Bengbu Yiwu International Commercial Complex 
(in the form of questionnaire) +/- 
General Manager 19092015 
Lijin Tiancheng Xianlinyuan Real Estate Company (in the form 
of questionnaire) !* 
General Manager 19092015 
Lijin Tiancheng Xianlinyuan Real Estate Company (in the form 




Lijin Tiancheng Xianlinyuan Real Estate Company (in the form 
of questionnaire) !* 
Office Director  19092015 
Lijin Tiancheng Xianlinyuan Real Estate Company (in the form 




Shanghe Time Real Estate Company (in the form of question-
naire)# 
General Manager 19092015 
 
 
 
